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Abstract:
Technology standards are pervasive in the modern economy, and a target for public and private
investments, yet evidence on their economic importance is scarce. I study the conversion of 13,000
miles of railroad track in the U.S. South to standard gauge between May 31 and June 1, 1886 as
a large-scale natural experiment in technology standards adoption that instantly integrated the
South into the national transportation network. Using route-level freight traffic data, I find a large
redistribution of traffic from steamships to railroads serving the same route that declines with route
distance, with no change in prices and no evidence of effects on aggregate shipments, likely due to
collusion by Southern carriers. Counterfactuals using estimates from a joint model of supply and
demand for North-South freight transport suggest that if the cartel were broken, railroads would
have passed through 50 percent of their cost savings from standardization, generating a 10 percent
increase in trade on the sampled routes. The results demonstrate the economic value of technology
standards and the potential benefits of compatibility in recent international treaties to establish
transcontinental railway networks, while highlighting the mediating influence of product market
competition on the public gains to standardization.
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On November 10, 2006, seventeen Asian countries ratified the Trans-Asian Railway Network Agree-
ment, under which they agreed to integrate into a continental railroad network by connecting lines
but refrained from adopting standards for interoperability (UNTC 2006), namely a common gauge
(track width). This agreement culminated over 50 years of negotiations, during which proposals
were “frustrated to a large extent by a lack of uniform railway gauge” across national boundaries
(UNESCAP 1996), much like similar proposed treaties in Europe and in the Middle East (UNTC
1991, 2003). To this day, there are at least five distinct gauges in use across the proposed Asian
network, necessitating costly interchange where railroads connect.
Compatibility standards are not only an important feature of transportation infrastructure: they
are pervasive in the modern economy, most notably in networked industries, as evidenced by the
vast collection of standards and standards-setting organizations (SSOs) convened around the world
today (Baron and Spulber 2015).1,2 In theory, incompatibilities impose a tax on transactions in
the form of a fixed cost of conversion, but there is little evidence that documents whether these
costs are large enough to materially affect economic activity or justify ex-post standardization of
systems that naturally, and perhaps efficiently, evolved to be incompatible (Liebowitz and Margolis
1995) – especially when adapters are available to help bridge the gap. Due to the difficulty of tying
economic outcomes to compatibility, and a lack of standards-adoption events at large enough scale
to be of economic significance, questions such as these remain unanswered.
This paper studies the conversion of all 13,000 miles of non-standardized railroad track in the
U.S. South to a standard-compatible gauge on May 31 and June 1, 1886 as a large-scale natural
experiment in standards adoption. In the 1860s, breaks in gauge were pervasive across the U.S.
railway network, with railroads constructed in as many as 23 distinct gauges (Siddall 1969). By the
1880s, this count had effectively narrowed to two: 5' 0'' gauge in the South, and 4' 8.5'' (“standard”)
gauge throughout the rest of the country. The gauge change instantly integrated Southern states
1A significant economics literature on compatibility standards has developed over the last 30 years, in the context of
research on information and communications technology with network effects. The theoretical literature traces back
to the seminal contributions of Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986, 1988, 1992) and Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986).
The empirical literature is considerably less developed, due to a lack of data (as noted by Baron and Spulber 2015).
Existing empirical research has studied related topics, such as standards battles in consumer electronics (Augereau
et al. 2006) and the behavior, impacts, and antitrust treatment of SSOs (e.g., Simcoe 2012, Rysman and Simcoe
2008, Anton and Yao 1995). A third subliterature studies path dependence in standards and technological lock-in,
concentrating on the history of the QWERTY keyboard as an example (Arthur 1989, David 1985, Liebowitz and
Margolis 1990). However there are few papers that examine the impacts of standards directly.
2Technical standards for interoperability also have a long history: standardization was one of the hallmark features
of the American system of manufacturing that propelled the U.S. to the forefront of industrialization in the 19th
century and is now pervasive in the U.S. and abroad (Hounshell 1985). Even the adoption of a common currency
can be interpreted as a technical standard for payments, yielding benefits from compatibility and integration (e.g.,
Frankel and Rose 2002, Rose and van Wincoop 2001).
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into the national transportation network. Using historical freight traffic data from the Southern
Railway & Steamship Association – a cartel of the major Southern railroads and steamship lines –
this paper estimates the effects of railroad gauge standardization on trade between the developing
South and the industrial North at the end of the century.
I find that the gauge change triggered a significant redistribution of freight traffic into the South
from steamships to railroads but did not generate an increase in total shipments. Over this same
period, records show that the cartel maintained its prices, implying that railroads did not pass
through any of the cost-savings achieved by the conversion. I then estimate supply and demand
for freight transport on the sampled routes and show that had the cartel been broken, the gauge
change would have produced a 10 percent average decline in freight rates and a corresponding 9
percent increase in aggregate shipments on the sampled routes. The effects of the gauge change
were thus large but simultaneously hindered by the collusive conduct of the industry.
The first U.S. railroads were constructed as local and regional enterprises to serve local needs. At
this time, opinions over the optimal gauge varied, and technical specifications of each railroad were
in the hands of the chief engineer. Without the vision of a national network, distinct gauges were
adopted by early railroads in different parts of the country, and subsequent construction tended to
adopt the neighboring gauge – leading to the formation of nine different “gauge regions” in the U.S.,
and a tenth in eastern Canada, by the 1860s (Puffert 2000, 2009). As a national network began
to emerge, the costs of these incompatibilities became too great to bear, and railroads gradually
converged on a common gauge, through conversion and new construction.
By the 1880s, nearly all U.S. railroads had adopted the 4' 8.5'' gauge, except for those in the South.
Data from both the U.S. Department of the Interior and Poor’s Manual of Railroads confirm that
whereas other regions had 95% or more of their track in standard gauge, 75% of that in Southern
states was in an incompatible, 5' 0'' gauge (even more if excluding Virginia and North Carolina).
Though adapters had developed to overcome breaks in gauge, all were imperfect, and accounts
suggest they were a substantial second-best to a fully integrated network.
In 1884 and 1885, two major 5' 0'' railroads connecting the South to the Midwest converted their
tracks to standard gauge, increasing pressure on the remaining Southern railroads to follow suit
and providing a template for execution. In early 1886, the members of the Southern Railway &
Steamship Association (SRSA) cartel, which together comprised a majority of mileage in the South,
agreed to convert all track to the standard-compatible gauge of 4' 9'' en masse over the two days
of May 31 and June 1, 1886, with all traffic halting on May 30 and resuming by the evening of
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June 1, effortlessly traversing the former breaks in gauge.3 The conversion was carefully planned,
seamlessly executed, and thoroughly documented by contemporaries.
The principal purpose of the cartel was to create and enforce noncompetitive pricing. It pursued
this goal with rate maintenance agreements and an enforcement mechanism whereby members were
allotted a fraction of route-level traffic, and those in excess of their allotment would have to pay
the excess revenue into a central fund for redistribution to other members. To implement this
mechanism, the SRSA administrative office collected, by submission and audit, records of freight
traffic carried to and from the Southern cities where two or more cartel members operated, which
were then circulated to member railroad and steamship carriers.
I use SRSA freight traffic and revenue data for individual carriers at the route- by year-level to
estimate the effects of the gauge change on merchandise shipments from the North into the South.
Invoking a variant on a triple-differences design, I compare within-route traffic borne by railroads
versus steamships before and after the conversion to 4' 9'' gauge, relaxing the effects to vary with
route distance. Steamships serve as a natural control for railroad traffic, as seaborne freight entirely
circumvented the gauge breaks and was therefore operationally unaffected by the conversion to a
compatible gauge. This framework identifies the elasticity of freight traffic with respect to the unit
cost of a break in gauge, which will be inversely proportional to route length.
The source material yields a balanced panel of 52 routes with inbound merchandise shipments data
both pre- and post-standardization. Within this sample, I find sharp effects of standardization on
rail-borne merchandise traffic from the North to the South, with about a 250% relative increase
in railroad traffic and revenue on short routes that decreases with distance; when split across the
two all-rail pathways into the South, I find relatively larger increases for the less-trafficked path.
Across all specifications, I find that the effects of conversion dissipate after about 700 to 750 miles.
The results are robust to a variety of fixed effects and within assorted subsamples.
Market share models return similar results, showing a large redistribution of traffic from steamships
to railroads, with effects dissipating at similar distances. However, I find no evidence of growth in
aggregate shipments through 1890: the effects appear to be limited to substitution across modes.
To better understand the reasons for this result, I examine cartel pricing for several routes in the
3The gauge of 4' 9'' was selected to conform to that of the Pennsylvania Railroad – an important connecting line –
and with the belief that a smaller change would reduce the expense of converting rolling stock, but it was understood
to be compatible with the 4' 8.5'' standard (Taylor and Neu 1956, Puffert 2009). As Taylor and Neu write, “such
a deviation was not considered a serious obstacle to through shipment.” The U.S. Government similarly noted in
1880 that “gauges from 4' 9.375'' to 4' 8'' may be considered standard,” as the same rolling stock may be used on
either “without objection” (U.S. Department of the Interior 1883).
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sample, finding that prices were stable over the sample period. While the gauge change affected
quality of service by improving rail transit times and reducing the risk of property loss, it evidently
was not sufficient to attract new traffic to the market absent price adjustments. The cartelization
of Southern transportation is thus critical to interpreting these results.
To evaluate whether the consumer welfare gains were constrained by collusion, I estimate a joint
model of supply and demand for freight transport over the sampled routes, and use the estimates to
evaluate a counterfactual in which all-rail and steamship carriers compete. I find that if the cartel
were broken, the conversion to a compatible gauge would have increased total traffic by roughly
10 percent, primarily due to a significant reduction in prices: in stark contrast to realized history,
on average 50 percent of railroads’ post-change cost savings are passed through to consumers in
the counterfactual. However, it is important to note that in a competitive environment, the gauge
change could itself come into question, as collusion or common ownership was required for railroads
to internalize the potentially large external returns to standardization, and non-competitive prices
were essential to recouping the fixed costs of the conversion.
The results add a new dimension to existing research on how transport infrastructure historically
facilitated trade (Donaldson 2015) and created economic value (Fogel 1964, Donaldson and Horn-
beck 2016, Swisher 2014), bringing out the importance of compatible gauge in railway networks
and physical and technological barriers to trade more generally. The results also offer lessons for
present-day investments in compatibility, which this paper shows can have large effects on economic
activity in settings where traffic is exchanged across interconnected networks, such as communi-
cations and transportation. In doing so, the paper contributes to a gap in the literature relating
compatibility standards to trade, an issue which “has long been reflected in multilateral trade
rules” (WTO 2005) but on which there is almost no empirical work (Gandal 2001), excepting two
recent studies on containerization in international shipping (Rua 2014, Bernhofen et al. 2016). The
present paper provides insight into the role that interoperability in transport networks can play in
promoting trade, and the findings acquire increased urgency in light of recent efforts to integrate
domestic railways into international networks without standardizing the gauge.
Finally, this paper highlights a tension between standardization and product market competition in
networked environments: collusion (or consolidation) is necessary for developers to internalize the
external returns to compatibility, but it also reduces the likelihood that resulting cost savings will
be passed through to consumers, limiting the scope for welfare gains from standardization. It may
be desirable to instead have a government simultaneously promote competition while mandating
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or subsidizing ex-post standardization, particularly if the social returns are believed to exceed the
cost of conversion. To my knowledge, this tension has not been fully explored, but further study is
beyond the scope of the paper, and I thus leave it to future research.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews U.S. railroad history and the natural experiment
at the heart of this paper. Section 2 introduces the data and describes the empirical strategy.
Section 3 estimates the effects of the gauge change on mode traffic shares and combined shipments
and explores potential explanations, emphasizing the importance of the institutional environment.
Section 4 then estimates supply and demand for freight transport, and Section 5 uses the results
to evaluate the effect of the gauge change in a counterfactual with competition. Section 6 discusses
the key lessons, particularly as related to (i) the benefits of interoperability and (ii) the mediating
influence of product market competition, as well as implications for the design of international rail
transportation agreements. Section 7 concludes.
1 History of U.S. Railroads and Gauge Standards
Diversity in gauge characterized U.S. railroads for most of the 19th century. The first railroads were
built with a local, or at most regional, scope, and “there was little expectation that [they] would one
day form an independent, interconnected” network (Puffert 2009), obviating any perceived benefits
of coordinating on a common gauge. Gauges were instead chosen by each railroad’s chief engineer,
and without clear evidence of an optimal gauge standard, diversity proliferated. As Puffert (2009)
recounts, the first wave of construction in the 1830s used four distinct gauges (4' 8.5'', 4' 9'', 4' 10'',
and 5' 0''), a second wave in the 1840s added three broader gauges to the mix (5' 4'', 5' 6'', 6' 0''),
and a “third wave of experimentation” in the second half of the century introduced several narrow
gauges, the most common of which were 3' 0'' and 3' 6''. Amongst this set, only 4' 8.5'' and 4' 9''
were mutually compatible and allowed for seamless interchange of traffic.4
The industry nevertheless recognized the advantages of interoperability, as subsequent construction
typically adopted the gauge of neighboring railroads. By the 1860s, a national network had begun
to emerge, but it was plagued by breaks in gauge as well as minor gaps in the physical network –
such that there were nine distinct “gauge regions” in the U.S. during the Civil War, and a tenth in
4See Puffert (2009) for a comprehensive discussion of the origins of U.S. railroad gauge. To this day, experts’ opinion
over the optimal gauge varies, though the choice is (i) understood to vary with operating conditions, and (ii) involves
tradeoffs, such that there is no dominating standard. Even so, experts tend to agree that wider gauge is preferable
to the modern standard (4' 8.5'') for its speed, stability, and carrying capacity (Puffert 2009).
5
Canada, each predominantly using a different gauge than neighboring regions. Panel (A) of Figure
1 gives a flavor of the state of U.S. railroads east of the Mississippi River at this time, showing lines
in 4' 8.5'' (“standard” gauge), 5' 0'' (“Southern” gauge), and other widths.
[Figure 1 about here]
Contemporaries in the 1850s noted that each break in gauge imposed a full-day delay on through
shipments and necessitated significant labor and capital for transshipment, which at the time was
performed manually, aided by cranes (Poor 1851, Taylor and Neu 1956). Diversity also required
railroads to preserve a large fleet of idle rolling stock at each break for transferring freight. Several
adapters developed to reduce these costs, such as bogie exchange (whereby each rail car would be
hoisted, and its chassis replaced with one of a different gauge), transporter cars (which carried cars
of a different gauge), adjustable-gauge wheels, and multiple-gauge track. Although bogie exchange
was the most common means of interchange, it was time-consuming and yielded a mismatched car
and bogie, which ran at reduced speeds and were prone to tipping on curves. The alternatives were
equally deficient: transporter cars were difficult to load and similarly created instability; variable-
gauge wheels loosened, causing derailment; and third rails required a gauge differential of at least
eight inches and were prohibitively expensive to construct and maintain.
After the Civil War, several pressures coincided to induce private efforts towards standardization,
including growing demand for interregional freight traffic and increasing trade in perishable goods,
which were heavily taxed by delays at breaks in gauge; competition within routes (to provide faster
service); and consolidation across routes (internalizing externalities of conversion). Despite known
technical shortcomings (Puffert 2009), 4' 8.5'' became the standard to which railroads conformed:
not only did standard gauge comprise a majority of U.S. mileage in every decade since the first
railroads were built, but it was also the principal gauge in the Northeast and Midwest, the loci of
trade in manufactured and agricultural goods. By the early 1880s, the common-gauge regions using
4' 10'', 5' 6'', and 6' 0'' had all converted to standard gauge, effectively leaving only two gauges in
widespread use: 5' 0'' in the South, and 4' 8.5'' in the rest of the country.5
5Concurrent with these conversions, physical gaps in the network were being closed around the country: cross-town
connections between depots were being built (e.g., Richmond in 1867) and rivers were being bridged (e.g., the Ohio
River at Louisville in 1868 and Cincinnati in 1877), such that differences in gauge were the only remaining obstacle to
a physically integrated network. A third impediment to through traffic was the moral hazard inherent to relinquishing
control over rolling stock on adjoining lines, or allowing other railroads’ cars to use (and potentially damage) one’s
own tracks. These issues were resolved around the same time by contracting innovations that established joint
ownership of rolling stock (Puffert 2009). Vertical relationships are discussed further in Appendix C.
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1.1 The Southern Railway & Steamship Association
Concurrent with (but independent of) these trends, Southern freight carriers self-organized into the
SRSA cartel in 1875, following a series of rate wars. The cartel’s express purpose was rate mainte-
nance: the preamble to the cartel agreement asserts the intent of achieving “a proper correlation
of rates,” to protect both its members and consumers from “irregular and fluctuating” prices and
“unjust discrimination” that favored certain markets over others (SRSA 1875). Membership was
open to all railroads and steamships operating south of the Potomac and Ohio Rivers and east of
the Mississippi and included nearly all major carriers in the region.
Though it had a rocky start, the SRSA grew into a sophisticated and highly successful organization
that was “one of the most powerful and disciplined” traffic pools in the country (White 1993) and
has been documented several times over (e.g., Hudson 1890, Joubert 1949, Argue 1990).6 The cartel
had its own central administration composed of representatives from its constituents, which had
the responsibility of carrying out the terms of the cartel agreement, making new rules as necessary,
and providing a venue for settling differences. This administration thus provided a government for
Southern freight carriers, with an executive, a legislature, and a judiciary.
The cartel administration included a Rate Committee, which determined prices for each route.
The mechanism used to ensure that members adhered to these prices was apportionment: carriers
serving a competed route were allotted a fixed proportion of traffic, determined by “the average
amount of freight hauled in past years” (Joubert 1949). In the early years of the cartel, carriers who
exceeded their allotment were required to submit the excess revenues to the cartel for redistribution
to other members, less a half-cent per ton-mile allowance for the expense of carriage. This plan
quickly unraveled when members reneged ex-post, and the agreement was amended to require
members to deposit 20% of revenue with the cartel at the time of shipment, out of which these
transfers would be made. To enforce the agreement, the cartel installed agents at stations to record
carriers’ daily traffic and revenue, appointed inspectors to ensure that freight was being properly
weighed and classified, and regularly audited members’ accounting records. These records were
compiled into monthly tables reporting traffic and revenue by route and carrier, which were then
circulated to members – and which have since been preserved.
The SRSA initially governed inbound merchandise shipments, and outbound cotton and textiles,
6The SRSA in fact preceded, was the model for, and shared a common founder with the Joint Executive Committee,
a cartel of railroads running between the Midwest and East Coast that has been widely studied in the economics
literature (e.g., Ulen 1979, Porter 1983, Ellison 1994, and others).
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between Atlanta, Augusta, Macon, and points in the North. Coverage soon grew to include several
other interior Southern cities (e.g., Newnan, West Point, Opelika, Montgomery, Selma). In 1885,
the cartel was expanded to cover passenger traffic on these routes, and in 1887, it folded rapidly-
growing “Western” routes (between the South and the Midwest) into the agreement. Given the late
addition of these routes to the cartel, this paper focuses on the effects of the gauge standardization
on so-called “Eastern” traffic between the North and South.
The amended mechanism proved so effective that in 1887, the cartel reported that “since 1878, all
balances have been paid and rates thoroughly maintained,” excepting one month in 1878 (Hudson
1890) – a sharp contrast to frequent pre-cartel rate wars. There are several reasons why the cartel
was successful, beginning with the mechanism itself, which muted carriers’ incentives to cut prices
to capture a greater share of traffic. Railroads that refused to join the cartel were denied through
traffic, which effectively amounted to a boycott. And the SRSA demonstrated early on that when
carriers (members or not) deviated from cartel prices, it would act quickly and decisively by cutting
rates to destructively low levels until the deviator complied.
The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) in February 1887 presented a new kind of threat
to the cartel. The ICA prohibited traffic pooling, making the cartel’s apportionment mechanism
illegal, however the act “by no means put an end to the power of the Association” (Hudson 1890).7
The SRSA responded by transitioning to a system of fines for price deviations, with mileage-based
deposits, and it continued collecting and disseminating members’ traffic and revenue. The SRSA
continued to operate in this way until 1890, when the Sherman Act delivered the lethal blow by
prohibiting combinations in restraint of trade. At this point, the cartel stopped circulating traffic
tables. Though it took several years for the courts to resolve initial ambiguities over whether the
SRSA met the statute’s definition, by 1897 the cartel had dissolved.
1.2 The Gauge Change
As trade between the South and other regions accelerated during Reconstruction, incompatibilities
became increasingly costly: by the 1880s, “not a prominent point could be found on the border [of
7The act had little impact in its early years, and if anything may have empowered carriers and helped stabilized
prices (Prager 1989, Blonigen and Cristea 2013), consistent with the revisionist interpretation of Kolko (1965), who
notes that railroads welcomed the regulation. Other sources suggest that the content of the ICA, and the Interstate
Commerce Commission it created, were subject to near-total regulatory capture. Gilligan et al. (1990) point out
that Albert Fink, the founder and first commissioner of the SRSA and “among the most respected railway officials
in the nation” (White 1993), provided much of the structure for the ICA, and that southern railroads were among
its “chief beneficiaries” as evidenced by abnormal stock price returns following its enactment – despite the fact that
these were railroads with “allegedly the most effective private cartels.”
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the South] without its hoist and acres of extra trucks” (Hudson 1887), and the total cost of delays
were growing one-for-one with volume. The first cracks in the 5' 0'' network developed in 1884 and
1885, when two major lines linking the South to the Midwest (the Illinois Central and the Mobile &
Ohio) converted their tracks to standard gauge, increasing pressure on their Southern competitors
and connections to follow suit, and providing a template for execution.
On February 2-3, 1886, cartel members convened to discuss the compatibility problem and agreed
to convert all of their track to a 4' 9'', standard-compatible gauge on May 31 and June 1 of that
year.8 The gauge change was carefully planned and seamlessly executed: in the weeks leading up
to the event, railroads removed the ties on their tracks and took a subset of their rolling stock (rail
cars, locomotives) out of service to adjust its gauge; then, on the evening of May 30, all traffic
halted, and teams of hired labor worked up and down each line, removing remaining ties, shifting
one rail 3'' inwards, resetting ties, and moving to the next segment. By midday on June 1, 13,000
miles of track had been converted to 4' 9'', and traffic had resumed, with freight now moving freely
across Southern borders in a physically integrated railroad network.9
The scale, operational details, and anticipated effects of the gauge change were widely discussed
in railroad journals and Southern newspapers in the months leading up to the conversion (Ap-
pendix B). To verify the scale of the conversion, I collect individual railroads’ gauges and mileage
from Poor’s Manual of Railroads (1882-1890), an annual compendium listing the universe of U.S.
railroads. Table 1 shows the miles of railroad in 4' 8.5-9'', 5' 0'', and other gauges by region and
year throughout the 1880s. Whereas other regions generally had 95% of their track in standard or
standard-compatible gauge by 1881, nearly 70% of Southern railroad mileage began the decade in
5' 0'' gauge. The discrepancy remained until the year of the gauge change: between 1885 and 1887,
the total in 5' 0'' gauge declined by 13,006 miles, and the fraction of Southern railroad in standard
or standard-compatible gauge discretely jumped from 29% to 92%. Panels (B) and (C) of Figure 1
show the updated gauge of the 1861 railroad network as of 1881 and 1891, respectively (omitting
new construction), illustrating the geographic scope of the conversion.
[Table 1 about here]
8The 4' 9'' gauge was selected to match the Pennsylvania Railroad system, an important connection in the Mid-
Atlantic, and because it was thought that smaller adjustments were less costly (Puffert 2009).
9The execution of the gauge change is covered in greater depth by several other sources. For extended summaries,
see Taylor and Neu (1956) or Puffert (2009). For a detailed, contemporary discussion of the nuts and bolts of the
planning and execution, see Hudson (1887). Extrapolating from the costs of converting the Louisville & Nashville
system (detailed in its 1886 annual report) to all 5' 0'' mileage, the total cost of the gauge change was likely around
$1.2 million in 1886, equivalent to $31 million today. To put the cost in perspective, the L&N’s expenditure on
conversion was roughly 30% of its investment in infrastructure in 1886 and 37% of net income.
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The historical record indicates that network externalities were important in propelling the gauge
change and were recognized by contemporaries. The returns to adopting a compatible gauge were
low for railroads on the periphery if interior neighbors did not follow – the effect would be to shift
the break from the top to the bottom of the line, with no benefits to through traffic – and negative
for interior railroads acting alone. But the gains to all parties were high under a coordinated,
regional conversion. Because the returns to conversion were increasing in the size of the standard
gauge network, one large system could also induce a cascade of standardization.10
The cartel served three important roles that enabled conversion to take place. First, it provided
an institutional venue for coordinating on a common gauge and organizing the conversion, similar
to SSOs today. More importantly, collusion internalized the externalities to adopting the common
standard, and non-competitive pricing ensured that railroads could recoup the expense of conver-
sion. Without either collusion or consolidation, the gauge change itself would be in question, and
integration would likely have been significantly retarded.
2 Data and Empirical Strategy
I use the SRSA records of freight traffic into and out of the South by railroad and steamship to
study the effects of the gauge change. I restrict attention to annual totals of merchandise shipped
from Northern port cities to the interior South, as merchandise shipments comprised the largest
fraction of tonnage in the South (35% of total; see U.S. Department of Interior 1883) and an even
greater fraction of revenue, and cotton shipments in the reverse direction yield a smaller sample and
may be confounded if destined for foreign markets.11 The sample throughout the paper consists of
52 North-South routes formally apportioned and monitored by the cartel both before and after the
gauge change (4 origins x 13 destinations), and a sample period spanning the 1883-84 to 1889-90
fiscal years. Table 2 lists – and Figure 2 maps – the origins and destinations in the sample. The
gauge change coincides precisely with the end of the 1885-86 fiscal year, such that the pre-period
consists of FY84 to FY86, and the post-period FY87 to FY90.
10As one contemporary noted, once the Louisville & Nashville (the largest railroad in the South at the time, with
over 2,000 miles) determined that it must adopt a standard-compatible gauge to compete for interregional traffic,
other large systems recognized that they “must move with the Louisville and Nashville,” and smaller railroads then
“had no choice in the matter but to join ranks” (Hudson 1887, p. 668).
11Invoking the annual data smooths out higher-frequency fluctuations and significantly simplifies the data collection,
while still providing enough variation to identify the effects of the gauge change. The choice to restrict attention to
inbound merchandise shipments is further motivated by the fact that outbound cotton shipments were dwindling
over the period, diverted by growing demand from Southern textile manufacturers.
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[Table 2 and Figure 2 about here]
Due to the diffuse ownership of the network, shipments to the interior South necessarily traversed
multiple railroads, or a steamship and a railroad, to reach their destination. The SRSA tables report
sequence-specific traffic and revenue, which I aggregate up to mode: all-rail versus steamship. I
include separate observations for the two all-rail paths into the South, the “Atlantic Coast Line”
(ACL) and the “Piedmont Air Line” (PAL, see Appendix A), each of whose constituent railroads
shared a common owner, and which are explicitly denoted in the SRSA tables. The primary sample
thus has 1,092 (= 52·3·7) observations at the route-mode-year level.12
The empirical strategy compares all-rail and steamship traffic within routes before and after the
gauge change. Because seaborne freight bypassed breaks in gauge, steamships were not directly
affected by the conversion and accordingly provide a control group for the treated all-rail mode. In
all cases, I relax the effects to vary with distance: breaks in gauge imposed a fixed cost on through
traffic, such that the per ton-mile unit costs were inversely proportional to route length. The first
set of specifications thus take the following form:
ln (Qmrt) = β0 + β1Railmrt + β2Postt + β3RailmrtPostt
+ β4RailmrtPosttDistr +Xmrtγ + εmrt , (1)
where Qmrt is pounds of traffic carried by mode m, on route r, in year t; Railmrt is an indicator
for the all-rail mode (ACL and PAL); Postt indicates the post-period; and Distr is the distance
from origin to destination. Throughout the analysis, I measure distance as straight-line distance,
rather than traveled distance, which is not observed (contemporary sources indicate the two are
in roughly fixed proportion; see Appendix A). The Xmrt term includes all other interactions plus
fixed effects. In all specifications, I cluster standard errors by route.
As Appendix Table A.2 shows, the sampled routes provide sufficient variation in distance (from
500 to 1,100 miles) to identify the elasticity of all-rail traffic with respect to the distributed (unit)
costs of gauge breaks. However, with imperfect competition in the market for freight transport,
the gauge change may affect steamship traffic indirectly in general equilibrium, contaminating the
control group. In a second set of specifications, I therefore estimate a model on market shares,
rather than quantities, which can account for this interdependence. Suppose mode shares are
generated by discrete consumer choices, where each mode has latent utility:
12To simplify the exposition, the specifications below are presented as if the ACL and PAL were aggregated into a




β0 + β1Railmrt + β2Postt + β3RailmrtPostt
+ β4RailmrtPosttDistr +Xmrtγ + ξmrt
]
+ ηimrt ≡ µmrt + ηimrt ,
where ηimrt is an error term distributed type-I extreme value. The market share for each mode
is then smrt =
exp(µmrt)∑
`=1,2 exp(µ`rt)
, which is jointly determined with that of the other mode. Indexing
railroads as m = 1 and steamships as m = 2, we can write:
ln(s1rt)− ln(s2rt) = µ1rt − µ2rt
= β˜0 + β˜1Postt + β˜2PosttDistr + γr + εrt , (2)
where the γr are route fixed effects (which will subsume the Distr variable). This model can then
be estimated by OLS on a sample of the all-rail observations.
Finally, to evaluate the effects of the gauge change on combined traffic, I collapse the sample to
route-years and estimate a specification for total shipments:
ln (Qrt) = β0 + β1Postt + β2PosttDistr + γr + εrt (3)
3 Standardization and Internal Trade
Though adapters like steam hoists were being used across the South by the 1880s, contemporaries
nonetheless believed that the gauge change would generate substantial growth in all-rail traffic. As
the secretary of the SRSA noted in a U.S. Treasury Department report on Southern transportation,
“the [current] movement via all-rail lines is very small, but will in the next few years develop very
much, because of the late change of all lines to one uniform gauge” (Sindall 1886, p. 679). Was
the conversion to the 4' 9'' gauge a large-enough improvement over the available adapters to affect
internal trade between the South and other regions, as predicted?
In this section, I show that the adoption of compatible gauge indeed provoked a large redistribution
of freight traffic on North-South routes from steamships to railroads, but it does not appear to have
increased shipments in the aggregate. It may be helpful to provide a roadmap to this section in
advance. I first contextualize the event within broader trends in trade between the South and other
U.S. regions, which was growing rapidly in the 1870s and 1880s. I then estimate the effects of the
gauge change on all-rail and steamship traffic, as well as on aggregate shipments. At the end of
the section, I consider explanations for these results, focusing on the ways in which collusion may
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have constrained consumers’ gains from standardization.
3.1 North-South Trade
Southern freight traffic grew rapidly over the 1870s and 1880s, during and after Reconstruction.
Until the early 1880s, the vast majority of Southern trade was with the North, and this trade was
conducted almost entirely by coastal steamship, in connection with interior railroad lines running
from those points (Sindall 1886, p. 679). However, with the growth of the Southern rail network
(Table 1) and Midwest industry and agriculture, the Southern trade expanded to the west over the
decade, to the point where “Western” traffic was incorporated into the cartel in 1887, and all-rail
shipping became a viable alternative for “Eastern” routes as well.
Table 3 shows overall trends in merchandise shipments for the sampled routes from 1884 to 1890.
Over the six-year interval, total shipments increased by 25%, driven by growth in steamship traffic.
The table also demonstrates heterogeneity in all-rail shares across origins – though this variation
will be subsumed by route fixed effects in regressions. Given the limited sample of routes, it will
nevertheless be important to test robustness across individual origins and destinations in the data.
Note that these totals likely understate growth in trade between the South and other regions, as
they do not account for the growth in Western traffic and on routes that entered service over the
decade as the transportation network expanded.
[Table 3 about here]
3.2 Effects of the Gauge Change
3.2.1 Distributional Effects
Table 4 provides the initial test of the effects of the gauge change, estimating the specification in
Equation (1), which regresses log traffic at the route-mode-year level on indicators for the all-rail
mode and the post-period, their interaction, and an additional interaction with route length (in
units of 100 miles), with the remaining interactions included but not listed for brevity. Column (1)
estimates this model as specified, while Columns (2) through (6) add an assortment of fixed effects
for routes, modes, years, route-modes, and route-years.
[Table 4 about here]
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The table shows the treatment effect and its interaction with distance, suppressing the other pa-
rameters. I find that the gauge change caused all-rail traffic to increase by 240-250% relative to
steamship traffic on short routes, with the effect diminishing on longer routes, reaching zero after
roughly 740 miles. This effect is stable across specifications.
In Table 5, I explore heterogeneity in these effects across the two all-rail paths between the North
and South, the ACL and PAL. This exercise is also in part a robustness check to see that both
lines were affected by the conversion to the new gauge. The results show that they were, with the
less-trafficked line (the ACL) experiencing a larger percentage increase in traffic. I find that the
effects dissipate at similar distances for both carriers, roughly 700 miles – statistically comparable
to the break-even distance in the previous table at usual significance levels. The effects are again
estimated to be larger relative to route-year averages versus other fixed effects.
[Table 5 about here]
As previously discussed, the estimates in Tables 4 and 5 may not be properly identified, due to the
interdependence of all-rail and steamship traffic in an imperfectly competitive market.13 In Table
6, I estimate a model that accounts for this interdependence (Equation 2), in which the outcome
variable is the log difference in all-rail and steamship shares. In taking this difference, most fixed
effects from the previous table are eliminated, such that Table 6 includes only two variants of the
regression: absent and with route fixed effects (Columns 1 and 2, respectively).
[Table 6 about here]
We continue to see positive effects of the gauge change on all-rail shares that decline with distance,
significant well beyond the one percent level. The estimates are similar across the two specifications,
and the effect of the gauge change is again estimated to dissipate at roughly 730 miles, as in Table
4. In Table 7, I split the effects out for the ACL and PAL. The effects are present for both carriers,
continue to be relatively larger for the ACL (the smaller of the two carriers), and again dissipate
after roughly 700 miles – much as in Table 5.
[Table 7 about here]
13In the language of causal inference, the risk is a violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA):
the assumption that untreated observations are unaffected by the treatment. In an imperfectly competitive market,
steamships (the control group) may be indirectly affected by the gauge change if they lose traffic to railroads. In
this case, a direct comparison would overstate its effects on growth in all-rail traffic.
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I also examine variation in the effects of the gauge change over time. A priori it is not obvious
whether the effects would be immediate or would phase in: on the one hand, the change was imme-
diate and comprehensive, and improved service available from the first day after the conversion; on
the other hand, it may have taken time for information to spread, and for shippers to adjust. To
evaluate this question, as well as to test for pre-trends, Table 8 re-estimates the model in Equation
(2), allowing the coefficients to vary by year.
[Table 8 about here]
Relative to the omitted year of 1884, the table shows that all-rail and steamship shares did not
change in a statistically significant way over the next two years leading up to the gauge change (if
anything, the signs of the estimates suggest all-rail shares were declining). Beginning in the first
year post-gauge change, we see a significant jump in all-rail shares that grows each year through
the end of the panel, and it appears to level out around 1890.
In Appendix D, I test the sensitivity of these results to dropping individual origins, destinations,
and years from the cartel sample. Given the limited number of routes (52) and the somewhat short
panel (3 years pre-gauge change, 4 years post), these checks are necessary to establish that the
results are not driven by outliers or subsamples (for example, by routes originating in Baltimore,
the origin nearest to the South). I find consistent results throughout. I also run similar regressions
for revenue, which is provided alongside the traffic statistics in the SRSA tables, and find identical
effects of the gauge change in sign and magnitude. This result is a natural consequence of the high
correlation (ρ = 0.99) between traffic and revenue in the data.
3.2.2 Aggregate Effects
The previous results established that the gauge change caused growth in all-rail freight shipments
relative to steamship traffic, but leave ambiguous to what degree this effect reflects displacement
of existing traffic versus the generation of new traffic. Table 9 answers this question, collapsing
the data to the route level and looking at the effects of the gauge change on total route traffic
and revenue (Equation 3). The even-numbered columns include route fixed effects. Across all
specifications, the change in traffic and revenue is not significantly different from zero. In particular,
we see no increase in traffic on shorter routes (where previous tables showed the gauge change had
the strongest effects on shares) relative to longer routes: the variation in the growth in route traffic
and revenue vis-a`-vis distance is a precisely-estimated zero.
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[Table 9 about here]
3.3 Explaining the Results
That the standardization of railway gauge caused economic activity to shift to the all-rail mode
is plausible, albeit not ex-ante obvious, given the widespread use gateway technologies pre-gauge
change that reduced the cost of incompatibility. This evidence alone implies welfare gains for the
switchers. But the lack of an effect on the extensive margin – the absence of an increase in aggregate
shipments – is surprising, and suggests that the consumer welfare gains were in fact constrained to
existing traffic. The most likely reason was the cartel itself.
Though the conversion to a compatible gauge increased railroads’ capacity and reduced costs by
eliminating interchange, cartel freight rates held constant around the conversion, which may have
precluded any change in aggregate shipments. The SRSA’s Circular Letters include tables with the
issued rates for shipments between various cities within and outside of the South, which list prices
by class of merchandise and were revised and republished every time rates were adjusted.14 These
tables make it possible to track route-level price changes over time.
Figure 3 show the distribution of rate changes on the routes in these circulars that are also in
the sample for this paper (total of 36 routes, out of the 52 routes in the previous tables). Each
observation in the figure is a route-class; with 36 routes and 13 classes, there are 468 observations
per period. The left panel of the figure shows the change in rates from February 1885 to March
1886 (a few months prior to the gauge change), and the right panel shows the change from March
1886 to July 1887 (over a year after the gauge change).
[Figure 3 about here]
An overwhelming fraction of routes do not update prices over this period. The handful of price
adjustments following the gauge change were increases, rather than decreases, and were limited to
two routes: Philadelphia-Montgomery and Philadelphia-Selma.15
14The SRSA classified freight into 13 different categories (classes) and set prices at the route and class level. More
irregular, fragile, or valuable goods were classified into higher classes, which were charged the highest rates. Rates
on lower classes were generally a fixed proportion of the first-class rate for each route.
15Cartel prices were not always so steady: until the early 1880s, prices were reduced regularly, under pressures of
competition from alternative routing outside the scope of the cartel. Multiple sources have documented this decline,
while also observing that price reductions ended in the early- to mid-1880s (e.g., Hudson (1890) documents prices
from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore to Atlanta from 1875 onwards, and shows that rate reductions
occurred every 1-2 years until 1884, after which rates went unchanged).
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Theoretical predictions for prices are ambiguous if demand for all-rail service shifted out concur-
rently with supply. But with the absence of an effect on total shipments, the evidence is puzzling:
if demand and supply shift similarly, prices may hold but total traffic should grow. And if demand
were insensitive to the gauge change, then prices should decline, with some of the railroads’ cost-
savings passed through. Gauge-inelastic demand is also inconsistent with the growth in all-rail
market share and the motivations for the gauge change itself.
A closer reading of SRSA documents suggests a potential reason why railroads’ cost-savings may
not have been passed through to prices: the rate-setting process was contentious, and revisions
required the unanimous approval of a committee composed of representatives from member carriers.
Compounding this obstacle was the fact that the cartel issued uniform rates for all carriers, likely
to avoid perceptions that individual members were being favored, and without comparable cost
reductions for steamships, it was difficult to get their representatives to consent to rate reductions
on the grounds of the gauge change alone. However, in the event of deadlock, proposed rate changes
would be evaluated by the cartel’s board of arbitration, which would then issue a ruling by simple
majority. In practice, many rate changes were enacted this way.
Another interpretation is that the cartel avoided pass-through and in turn suppressed the welfare
gains that would have otherwise been realized by the conversion to a compatible gauge. The natural
question is then: what would have happened to prices and total traffic had the cartel been broken?
The remainder of the paper seeks to answer this question.
4 The Market for Shipping
To evaluate counterfactual prices and traffic under competition, I model the market for North-South
freight shipment. The model assumes shippers in a given route and year make a discrete choice
between the all-rail and steamship modes to maximize utility, and that railroads and steamships
concurrently set prices to maximize joint or individual profits (under collusion or competition, re-
spectively), under the constraint that collusive prices must be the same for railroads and steamships
serving a given route – as was the case for the SRSA cartel.
In this model, markets are defined as route-years. Though there are 364 (= 52 · 7) markets in the
full sample, there are only 288 for which I have price data, such that the sample for this exercise
will be restricted to N = 288 markets. Within each of these markets, I observe the share of traffic
supplied by all-rail and steamship modes, but as in other models of demand I must assume a total
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market size, which I fix to twice the observed traffic.
Each market is characterized by prices {P1rt, P2rt}, quantities {Q1rt, Q2rt}, and marginal costs
{MC1rt,MC2rt} where m = 1 denotes the all-rail mode and m = 2 denotes the steamship mode.
Under the cartel, P1rt = P2rt = Prt, whereas under competition mode prices are allowed to differ.
Quantities throughout this and the next section are measured in 100-pound units, while prices and
marginal costs are in dollars per 100 pounds of freight on the given route.16 Though the SRSA
priced freight according to a complex classification scheme (with more valuable, irregular, or fragile
goods charged higher prices, and bulk commodities charged the lowest prices), the SRSA traffic
tables aggregate shipments across classes of merchandise. I thus calculate a weighted average price
for each route, weighting by the share of route traffic in each class in 1880, and treat freight as
being homogeneous in composition and priced at this index.
4.1 Demand
Suppose the latent utility of each mode m for shipper i on route-year rt is uimrt, and shippers make
a discrete choice over mode to maximize utility, as follows:
max
m
uimrt = Gmrt (β1 + β2Distr)− αPmrt + γm + ξmrt + ηimrt ≡ δmrt + ηimrt ,
where Gmrt indicates that mode m requires transshipment in route-year rt, Distr is distance
between route r origin and destination, Pmrt is the price of mode m in route-year rt (calculated
as the weighted average of rates across all classes of merchandise, as before), γm represents mode
dummies, ξmrt is a mean-zero, route-mode-year specific unobservable, and εimrt is an i.i.d. type-
I extreme value error. Mean utility of each mode is denoted as δmrt, and the outside option
(withholding shipment) is indexed m = 0 and normalized to have δ0rt = 0.
Under this specification, consumers may have an inherent preference for each mode, but choices are
also influenced by prices and by the necessity of transshipment. From this specification of utility,






As in Equation (2), we can log-difference the outside market share to obtain the following reduced-
16Marginal costs should be interpreted as the cost of transporting 100 pounds on a given route, via a given mode, in
a given year, which is a function of the mode, distance, and transshipment (if required).
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form equation, which can be used to estimate the demand parameters:
ln(smrt)− ln(s0rt) = Gmrt (β1 + β2Distr)− αPmrt + γm + ξmrt (4)
When this model is taken to the cartel data, Pmrt will effectively be reduced to Pr, as prices on the
sampled routes are constant within routes across modes and nearly constant over time. I estimate
this model by 2SLS, instrumenting for prices with route length, a principal determinant of costs
and prices for long-distance freight shipment. The necessary assumption to satisfy the exclusion
restriction is that distance only affects demand through prices.
4.2 Supply
The cartel is assumed to set prices on each route to maximize joint profits, subject to the constraint










(Prt −MCmrt) · smrt(Prt)
with
MCmrt = λmDistr + θmGmrt + ωrt ,
where λm is the marginal cost of shipping an additional 100 pounds of freight per 100 miles of
route length via mode m, θm is the cost of interchange at breaks in gauge (for all-rail traffic) or
transshipment at port (for steamship traffic), and ωrt is a mean-zero cost shock shared by both
modes on a given route, in a given year.
The cartel’s first-order condition for each route-year is then:
(s1 + s2) + (P −MC1) · ∂s1(P )
∂P
+ (P −MC2) · ∂s2(P )
∂P
= 0
which can be rewritten to be linear in the cost parameters, as in Equation (5) below. I invoke this
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I proceed with estimation via a bootstrap procedure, in five steps:17
1. Estimate demand (Equation 4) via 2SLS, with clustered standard errors
2. Draw demand parameters from their joint distribution
3. Use draws to predict market shares and calculate elasticities
4. Estimate supply (Equation 5) via OLS with clustered SEs
5. Bootstrap: Repeat steps 2 through 5 (x2000)
This procedure will return a single set of estimates for demand, with standard errors clustered by
route as before, and 2,000 sets of estimates for supply, which account for the parameters’ sampling
variance as well as the variance of the predicted market shares and elasticities entering the supply
equation, which are generated from estimated parameters themselves.
4.4 Parameter Estimates
Table 10 shows the results for both demand and supply. The demand estimates (left panel) show an
embedded preference for steamships over the all-rail mode and a negative effect of transshipment on
demand, diminishing with route length as in previous results, breaking even around 800 miles. We
also see that distance strongly predicts freight tariffs (F >200), validating the choice of instrument,
and a negative price coefficient of sensible magnitude (α=−9).
[Table 10 about here]
17In concept, a supply and demand system can be jointly estimated via GMM or by a bootstrap, but a GMM
procedure here is complicated by the different dimensionalities of the demand and pricing equations (specified at
the level of route-mode-years and route-years, respectively) and sensitive to starting values. Given its transparency
and computational simplicity in this setting, I opt for the bootstrap.
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The marginal cost estimates (right panel) show that breaks in gauge impose a large fixed cost on
interregional freight traffic, roughly $0.08 per 100 pounds (over 10% of the median freight tariff for
routes in this sample). This estimate reflects not only the direct cost of interchange, but also the
indirect costs of time delays, the large fleet of idle rolling stock kept at points of interchange, and the
purchase and maintenance of steam hoists themselves, which will be capitalized into prices (White
1993). Though expensive, bogie exchange was still cheaper than breaking bulk: transshipment costs
at port are nearly $0.21 per 100 pounds, due to the increased labor requirements, time delays, and
risk of stolen or damaged goods. We also see similar operating costs per 100 miles of straight-line
distance for each mode, at around $0.04 per 100 pounds, or 0.8 cents per ton-mile. Though the
cost of carriage by sea was at this time lower than costs by rail per mile traveled, steamships (and
their last-mile railroad connections) would have had to travel a longer, less-direct path to interior
Southern cities, offsetting this cost advantage in the estimates.18
Besides the functional form, recall that the principal assumption of this model is that the total
latent market size for each route-year is twice the observed traffic. As in other examples of demand
estimation (e.g., Berry et al. 1995), this assumption is necessary to compute outside shares, though
its choice is validated by the fact that the estimates, and the counterfactuals simulated from them,
are nonsensical under alternatives. The estimates and counterfactuals should nevertheless be in-
terpreted as suggestive rather than incontrovertible evidence; in other words, the usual caution in
interpreting structural estimates continues to apply.
5 Standardization with Competition
The question motivating the estimation was whether the gauge change would have increased trade
in a competitive environment. To answer this question, I apply the estimates to simulate a coun-
terfactual in which the two modes compete on prices in a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. This exercise
assumes a single price-setter for each mode, and thus only partially breaks the cartel, since there
were two all-rail service providers and multiple steamship lines. Given the limitations of the data
(which, as previously described, are provided at the level of paths, which sometimes involved mul-
18To put these estimates in perspective, note that observers in the 1850s estimated that breaks in gauge generated
handling costs of $0.25-0.50 per ton in the 1850s and a delay of 24 hours, equivalent to roughly 300 miles’ distance
at typical speeds (Poor 1851, Dartnell 1858). These costs (handling and time delays) would have been significantly
reduced by steam hoists and other adapters in use by the 1880s, which made breaking bulk unnecessary, but
contemporaries’ figures do not account for indirect costs (e.g., the cost of maintaining excess rolling stock), which
may be large. As a benchmark for operating costs, recall that the SRSA permitted members exceeding their quota
a 0.5 cent per ton-mile allowance for the cost of carriage before exacting penalties.
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tiple carriers and were not all present in every market), as well as recurrent distinctions between
all-rail and steamship modes in both the data and the narrative record (in which contemporaries
predicted that all-rail traffic would grow relative to steamship traffic under a uniform gauge), reduc-
ing the dimensionality of the counterfactual to modes (rather than paths, or carriers) is a natural
choice, and sufficient for evaluating the question at hand.
To simulate this counterfactual, we need to solve for the competitive equilibrium. Each mode m
will set prices to maximize profits, with the following first-order condition:
smrt(P1rt, P2rt) + (Pmrt −MCmrt) · ∂smrt
∂Pmrt
= 0












into which we can plug the parameter estimates and numerically solve for prices {P˜mrt}, which in
turn imply quantities {Qmrt(P˜1rt, P˜2rt)} and profits {Πmrt(P˜1rt, P˜2rt)}.
The results are provided in both tabular and graphical form in Table 11 and Figure 4. The table
summarizes prices, traffic, and profits for the all-rail and steamship modes separately for the pre-
period (Panel A) and the post-period (Panel B). In the pre-period, competition would drive down
the average all-rail tariff by 27% and steamship tariff by 6%. The reduction in prices generates a
21% increase in total traffic, powered by a near doubling in all-rail shipments. Industry profits fall
sharply, with a 56% decline for all-rail and 47% decline for steamships.
[Table 11 about here]
Recall that the gauge change eliminated a fixed cost of interchange at breaks in gauge. I find that
in a competitive market, railroads would have passed nearly half of these cost-savings through to
prices, yielding even larger reductions in all-rail tariffs and increases in all-rail and total traffic in
the post-period. As in the pre-period, competition would drive down profits for all firms, with a net
33% decline in profits for Southern freight carriers as a whole – although railroad profits would have
been insulated by their newly developed advantage in providing uninterrupted service post-gauge
change. Figure 4 provides a visualization of these effects.
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[Figure 4 about here]
A more direct test of impact that uniform gauge would have had on total shipments in a competitive
market structure is to simulate a competitive post-period with and without breaks in gauge. This
comparison avoids any potential contemporaneous changes in the market that could challenge the
attribution of pre- versus post-gauge change differences in Table 11 to compatibility alone. Table
12 provides this comparison, showing that relative to a competitive post-period without the gauge
change, compatibility reduces all-rail prices by 10% and increases total traffic by 9%, driven entirely
by growth in all-rail traffic, which comes partly from stealing market share from steamships and
partly by drawing new traffic into the market.
[Table 12 about here]
Results in Context: Standardization in Other Regions
Though data are not available to study earlier conversions in other regions, which anyway occurred
piecemeal and at smaller scale, we can look to the historical record for external validation. The
most quantitative discussion of the effects of standardized gauge on railroad operations comes from
the Erie Railway Company in the early 1870s, when it was considering conversion from 6' 0'' to
standard gauge. According to Blanchard (1873), the motivation for conversion was that the Erie’s
broad gauge was costing it substantial traffic, because shippers “demand quick time” and preferred
routing that carried freight all the way to its destination “under lock and seal” as opposed to
requiring transfers, which “increase the probabilities of loss, damage, and detention.” As evidence
of the potential returns, he evaluates the most recent example of conversion in North America (the
Grand Trunk Railway of Canada, in 1873), and notes that its net income in the subsequent nine
weeks (up to the date of publication) had grown 15% over the previous nine weeks and over the
same nine weeks in the prior year, due to both lower costs and greater revenue, while its Canadian
and American competitors had concurrently lost revenue.
6 Implications for Research and Policy
These results offer lessons for both research and policy. The foremost lesson is that standards can be
economically important. Despite a large theoretical literature on compatibility, and a recent body
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of work on standards-setting organizations, there is little evidence explicitly linking compatibility
to economic outcomes. In showing that the standardization of railroad gauge in the 1880s materi-
ally affected trade, this paper has implications for other settings where traffic is exchanged across
connecting, incompatible networks. For example, early efforts at computer networking yielded to
multiple networks that developed alongside the Internet, each of which used a proprietary naming
system for addressing email traffic; intercommunication was enabled by gateways but was so com-
plex that that only the most technical users could do so until these networks adopted the domain
name system as a common standard (Greenstein 2015, Partridge 2008).
The results also yield a deeper lesson on the interaction of standards with product market compe-
tition. In many settings, transactions must be executed via intermediaries who provide physical or
digital infrastructure for transmission, such as freight carriers (for physical trade), Internet service
providers (for communications), and financial exchanges (for asset purchases). These intermediaries
often must interconnect with others for delivery. This paper shows that compatibility at connec-
tion points can generate large welfare gains – but only if the cost savings are passed through to
consumers, which is unlikely to occur if service is not competed. Because these settings experience
network effects and are inherently likely to be concentrated, a lack of competition is often a reality,
and the results of this paper immediately relevant.
Direct Applications: Modern International Railways
In addition to these contributions, the results have direct bearing on modern-day railway networks.
Breaks in gauge are still common around the world, especially in developing regions such as South
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These breaks often occur at national boundaries, though in some
cases they are present within them as well – most notably in India, which is nearing the end of an
effort to standardize the gauge of its 100,000-mile network. Appendix Figure E.1 illustrates how
pervasive the problem is, showing a world map of countries color-coded by the principal gauge of
their railways. Developing regions generally have 3 or 4 gauges in use.
The problem has not escaped the attention of policymakers: resolving differences in gauge has been
a focal point in repeated international negotiations to integrate domestic railways into transconti-
nental networks in places like Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The most recent example of such
an agreement was the United Nations-brokered Trans-Asian Railway (TAR) Network Agreement,
ratified by 17 Asian countries in 2006 (UNTC 2006). The negotiations behind this agreement date
back to the 1950s, when the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (now the U.N.
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Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, or UNESCAP) set out to link Istanbul
and Singapore (UNESCAP 1996). The intent was to establish more direct, overland routes between
Europe and East Asia to support and promote international trade. Integrating the transportation
network became increasingly imperative as trade grew over the following decades, but “this pro-
posal, and the many that followed it, were frustrated ... by the lack of a uniform railway gauge
... and by the presence of gaps, or missing links, in the route” (UNESCAP 1996). Gaps could
be filled, but it proved impossible to negotiate a common gauge standard, and when a treaty was
finally ratified, it contained no provisions for standardizing the gauge.
As a result, while there are now major lines connecting all parts of the continent, freight moving
between Europe and Southeast Asia must cross three breaks in gauge (see Appendix Figure E.2).
These breaks remain costly, interrupting the movement of both passengers and cargo and imposing
delays. And although more than a century has passed, the same adapters are still being used today:
documentation points to transshipment, bogie exchange, and variable gauge as the principal means
of interchange. The TAR is also not unique in this regard: a similar agreement in Europe (UNTC
1991) lists the stations where interchange would have to occur and specifies whether it would be
conducted by transshipment or bogie exchange (Appendix Table E.2).
In this context, the results of this paper offer lessons for present-day treaties and policies governing
transport network integration. The main lesson is that eliminating breaks in gauge significantly
improves the quality of rail-based freight shipping services, enough to divert traffic from other
modes – and if operators’ cost-savings are passed through to consumers, enough to increase the
total volume of trade. It is important to nevertheless be cautious in extending these results to a
different time period, geography, and market structure (many railroads are nationalized), but given
the parallels, it seems appropriate to view the evidence in this paper as instructive of the potential
benefits of interoperability under a common gauge.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the conversion of 13,000 miles of railroad in the U.S. South to a standard-
compatible gauge in 1886 on internal trade between the South and the North. The gauge change
integrated the South into the national railroad network and provides a large-scale natural experi-
ment for studying the effects of interoperability standards on economic activity. Using comprehen-
sive records of merchandise shipments on 52 North-to-South routes from a cartel that governed this
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traffic, I find that the gauge change precipitated a large transfer of market share from steamships
to railroads that declines with distance but did not affect total shipments.
To reconcile these results, I turn attention to the cartel itself, which held prices constant around
the conversion – likely limiting any response on the extensive margin. The natural question is then
whether standardization would have led to lower prices and increased trade in a competitive market.
To evaluate this question, I estimate a model of the industry and simulate counterfactuals in which
the all-rail and steamship transport modes compete. The results of this exercise suggest that in a
competitive industry, the standardization of the gauge would have generated a 27% reduction in
all-rail prices and 20% growth in aggregate shipments.
The results offer several lessons, the foremost of which is that compatibility can have a large,
material effect on economic activity in industries where exchange takes place over interconnected
networks. The paper in particular sheds light on the potential benefits to standardizing the gauge of
global railroad networks, which continue to suffer from breaks in gauge that necessitate costly inter-
change. Finally, the results point to a complex interaction of standardization and product market
competition in networked environments. While collusion (or consolidation) increases firms’ incen-
tives to make their networks interoperable by internalizing the externality, it also harms consumers
and limits the welfare gains from standardization. This tension presents an important tradeoff for
antitrust regulators that is underappreciated in the literature on standards or competition but is
ripe for attention, given recent antitrust scrutiny on several large Internet and communications
firms with products that benefit from interoperability.
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Notes: Figure shows the northern route origins and southern destinations
for routes in the sample. These destinations are those for which data was
reported by the Southern Railway and Steamship Association both before
and after the gauge change. Freight transportation was available by all-rail
routes traversing Virginia, Tennessee, and the Carolinas or by a combina-
tion of steamship and railroad, via southern port cities such as Charleston,
Savannah, Norfolk, and Port Royal.
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Figure 3: Distribution of Cartel Price Changes, pre- vs. post-Gauge Change
Notes: Figure shows the distribution of cartel price changes across routes and
classes of merchandise from February 1885 to March 1886 (left panel) and
March 1886 to July 1887 (right panel), for the subset of routes included in
the SRSA rate tables. The handful of rate increases in the latter period come
entirely from two routes: Philadelphia to Montgomery, and Philadelphia to
Selma. Data from SRSA Circular Letters, Volumes 13-24.
Figure 4: Prices, Quantities, and Profits in Competitive Counterfactual
Notes: Figure shows mean prices, total traffic, and est. profits for railroads
and steamships, as observed and in a counterfactual in which they compete.
The figure is a visual presentation of the data in Table 11.
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Table 1: Approx. Miles of Railroad in each Gauge, by Region, 1881-1889 (Poor’s Manual of Railroads)
Pre-Gauge Change Post-Gauge Change
New England 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889
Miles in gauge:
4’ 8.5-9” 6,060.2 6,082.6 6,237.8 6,600.3 6,627.6
5’ 0” 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 191.1 201.2 180.4 184.6 116.5
Total Miles 6,251.3 6,283.8 6,418.2 6,784.9 6,744.1
Pct. 4’ 8.5-9” 97% 97% 97% 97% 98%
Mid-Atlantic
Miles in gauge:
4’ 8.5-9” 14,855.0 17,590.3 18,923.4 18,648.6 20,210.7
5’ 0” 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.0
Other 990.2 997.4 868.3 772.0 682.5
Total Miles 15,845.6 18,588.1 19,792.2 19,420.9 20,893.3
Pct. 4’ 8.5-9” 94% 95% 96% 96% 97%
Midwest
Miles in gauge:
4’ 8.5-9” 34,904.3 38,669.2 37,904.4 42,241.2 45,938.1
5’ 0” 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 2,342.1 2,800.7 2,591.3 1,318.3 1,028.7
Total Miles 37,246.4 41,470.0 40,495.6 43,559.5 46,966.7
Pct. 4’ 8.5-9” 94% 93% 94% 97% 98%
South (focal region)
Miles in gauge:
4’ 8.5-9” 4,306.8 4,759.6 6,048.6 21,593.6 25,252.7
5’ 0” 11,908.1 12,964.5 13,274.2 268.2 19.5
Other 1,042.7 1,592.6 1,371.5 1,734.9 1,521.2
Total Miles 17,257.5 19,316.6 20,694.3 23,596.7 26,793.4
Pct. 4’ 8.5-9” 25% 25% 29% 92% 94%
Western States
Miles in gauge:
4’ 8.5-9” 26,272.5 33,817.6 36,435.9 47,694.8 54,352.6
5’ 0” 135.0 135.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 3,427.4 5,623.2 4,642.0 4,253.6 3,965.9
Total Miles 29,834.8 39,575.8 41,078.0 51,948.4 58,318.5
Pct. 4’ 8.5-9” 88% 85% 89% 92% 93%
Notes: Table shows the approximate miles of railroad in the U.S. from 1881 to 1889 in two-year
intervals, by region and gauge, confirming the scale of the conversion: 13,000 miles of Southern
railroad converted from 5’0” to 4’ 9” between 1885 and 1887. Data from Poor’s Manual of
Railroads, which provides a near-complete, annual enumeration of U.S. railroads. The data are
subject to regional classification errors which tend to over-attribute mileage to the Midwest,
pulling from the Mid-Atlantic and West, as a result of railroads with principal operations in
the Midwest extending into these regions. The table uses the regional definitions of the Poor’s
Manual; the southern states are Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi,
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, the Carolinas, and Louisiana.
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Table 2: Origins and Destinations for Sampled Routes
Destinations Origins
(south) (north)
Albany GA Boston MA
Athens GA New York NY
Atlanta GA Philadelphia PA








A. & W. Pt. stations (GA)
W. & A. stations (GA)
Notes: Table lists the origin and terminus of routes in the
sample of Northern merchandise shipments used in the re-
mainder of this paper. These 52 routes (4 origins x 13
destinations) are those for which data was reported by the
Southern Railway and Steamship Association both before
and after the gauge change. “A. & W. Pt. Stations” refers
to stations on the Atlanta and West Point Railroad between
East Point and West Point, GA (70 mi), whose traffic was
reported collectively; “W. & A. Stations” refers to stations
on the Western and Atlantic Railroad between Chattanooga,
TN and Marietta, GA (87 mi). These destinations are geo-
tagged to the centroid of their respective endpoints.
Table 3: Trends in Southern Freight Traffic, by Mode and Route Length (sampled routes only)
Pre-Gauge Change Post-Gauge Change
1883-84 1884-85 1885-86 1886-87 1887-88 1888-89 1889-90
Panel A. Mean across routes <25th percentile distance
Total traffic (million lbs.) 0.75 0.69 0.70 0.74 0.83 0.87 0.83
(0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.27) (0.31) (0.32) (0.29)
via rail 0.70 0.51 0.64 0.88 0.94 0.84 0.93
(0.26) (0.21) (0.30) (0.33) (0.38) (0.33) (0.34)
via steamship 0.80 0.88 0.76 0.60 0.72 0.91 0.72
(0.26) (0.26) (0.22) (0.19) (0.24) (0.33) (0.24)
Panel B. Mean across routes >75th percentile distance
Total traffic (million lbs.) 0.97 0.94 1.28 0.96 1.13 1.13 1.43
(0.47) (0.42) (0.56) (0.44) (0.55) (0.55) (0.73)
via rail 0.28 0.38 0.58 0.53 0.44 0.25 0.35
(0.17) (0.24) (0.36) (0.41) (0.34) (0.17) (0.23)
via steamship 1.67 1.50 1.99 1.39 1.83 2.01 2.50
(0.59) (0.51) (0.67) (0.46) (0.67) (0.69) (0.93)
Notes: Table reports average merchandise shipments by year on shorter routes (<25th per-
centile) versus longer routes (>75th percentile), breaking out the totals by mode. The table
illustrates the rapid growth in Southern freight traffic over the 1880s on a set of routes that were
serviced throughout the decade. Southern trade growth would be even higher when considering
routes that entered service over the decade, as the rail network expanded (Table 1 shows the
growth in mileage). Standard errors of the mean shown in parentheses.
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Table 4: Change in All-Rail Traffic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.437*** 2.429*** 2.425*** 2.484*** 2.466*** 2.541***
(0.460) (0.455) (0.455) (0.466) (0.559) (0.582)
* distance (100 mi) -0.322*** -0.328*** -0.328*** -0.334*** -0.331*** -0.341***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.073) (0.075)
Breakeven distance 756.5 740.5 740.1 742.8 744.1 745.6
(34.9) (32.7) (32.7) (32.7) (39.8) (39.7)
N 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036
R2 0.32 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.75
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: Table estimates effect of the gauge change on merchandise shipments from North to
South. Observations are route-mode-years. The treated group consists of the all-rail mode;
the control group, the steamship mode. The “breakeven distance” at which the effects of
standardization dissipate to zero is provided below the regression estimates. The dependent
variable in all columns is log pounds of traffic. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1,
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table 5: Change in All-Rail Traffic, ACL and PAL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A.C.L. x post-change 2.840*** 2.852*** 2.851*** 2.826*** 2.848*** 2.809***
(0.527) (0.559) (0.560) (0.552) (0.686) (0.671)
* distance (100 mi) -0.398*** -0.402*** -0.402*** -0.396*** -0.403*** -0.396***
(0.071) (0.076) (0.076) (0.074) (0.094) (0.090)
P.A.L. x post-change 1.809*** 1.743*** 1.733*** 1.808*** 1.748** 1.829**
(0.555) (0.610) (0.609) (0.607) (0.754) (0.754)
* distance (100 mi) -0.238*** -0.244*** -0.243*** -0.248*** -0.247** -0.253**
(0.071) (0.080) (0.079) (0.080) (0.100) (0.101)
Breakeven distance (A.C.L.) 713.6 709.6 709.7 713.4 705.9 709.8
(32.5) (32.7) (32.8) (34.5) (39.0) (41.5)
Breakeven distance (P.A.L.) 759.0 715.7 713.5 728.3 707.3 723.9
(53.2) (58.6) (58.8) (55.6) (70.4) (66.5)
N 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036 1036
R2 0.48 0.83 0.84 0.89 0.86 0.91
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: Table estimates effect of the gauge change on merchandise shipments from North to
South. Observations are route-mode-years. The treatment group consists of these carriers.
The control group remains the steamship mode. The “breakeven distance” at which the
effects of standardization dissipate to zero is provided below the regression estimates. The
dependent variable in all columns is log pounds of traffic. *, **, *** represent significance
at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table 6: Effects on Traffic Shares
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.281*** 2.400***
(0.428) (0.450)
* distance (100 mi) -0.315*** -0.327***
(0.056) (0.058)





Notes: Table estimates effect of the gauge change on
all-rail traffic shares. The dependent variable is the
log difference in all-rail and steamship shares within
route-years. The “breakeven distance” at which the
effects of standardization dissipate to zero is provided
below the regression estimates. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respec-
tively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table 7: Effects on Traffic Shares, ACL and PAL
(1) (2)
A.C.L. x post-change 2.848*** 2.809***
(0.554) (0.542)
* distance (100 mi) -0.403*** -0.396***
(0.076) (0.073)
P.A.L. x post-change 1.461** 1.647***
(0.593) (0.576)
* distance (100 mi) -0.216*** -0.232***
(0.076) (0.076)
Breakeven distance (A.C.L.) 705.9 709.8
(31.5) (33.5)





Notes: Table estimates effect of the gauge change on
all-rail traffic shares. The dependent variable is the
log difference in all-rail and steamship shares within
route-years. The “breakeven distance” at which the
effects of standardization dissipate to zero is provided
below the regression estimates. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respec-
tively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table 8: Increasing Effect on Shares over Time
(1) (2)
All-rail x 1885 -0.914 -0.914
(0.701) (0.729)
* distance (100 mi) 0.071 0.071
(0.093) (0.097)
All-rail x 1886 -0.711 -0.630
(0.863) (0.813)
* distance (100 mi) 0.079 0.073
(0.111) (0.105)
All-rail x 1887 1.343** 1.500**
(0.543) (0.576)
* distance (100 mi) -0.183** -0.199**
(0.074) (0.078)
All-rail x 1888 1.622** 1.753**
(0.751) (0.790)
* distance (100 mi) -0.271*** -0.282***
(0.098) (0.103)
All-rail x 1889 1.938** 2.069**
(0.777) (0.819)
* distance (100 mi) -0.290*** -0.300***
(0.102) (0.107)
All-rail x 1890 2.040*** 2.197***
(0.678) (0.720)





Notes: Table estimates the effect of the gauge change on
all-rail traffic shares by year, relative to the omitted year
of 1884. The dependent variable is the log difference in
all-rail and steamship shares within route-years. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table 9: Change in Total Traffic/Revenue
Ln(Freight traffic) Ln(Revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Post-change 0.039 0.051 -0.114 -0.091
(0.230) (0.222) (0.183) (0.186)
* distance (100 mi) -0.000 -0.006 0.009 0.003
(0.031) (0.028) (0.023) (0.022)
N 360 360 360 360
R2 0.01 0.96 0.01 0.97
Route FE X X
Notes: Table estimates the effect of the gauge change on
total shipments. Observations are route-years. The de-
pendent variable in Columns (1) to (2) is log pounds of
traffic; in Columns (3) to (4), log dollars of revenue. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table 10: Supply and Demand Estimates
Demand Parameters Marginal Costs ($ per 100 lbs.)
Break in gauge -3.42*** Break in gauge 0.079***
(0.71) (0.027)
* distance (100 mi) 0.43*** Transshipment 0.207***
(0.09) (0.088)
Rail dummy 4.54*** Distance, rail 0.044***
(1.11) (0.008)
Steam dummy 6.41*** Distance, steam 0.042***
(1.13) (0.009)
Price ($ per 100 lbs.) -8.98*** N 244







Notes: Table shows estimates from the joint estimation of demand and
supply for freight traffic on the subsample of routes for which prices are
available. Demand is estimated over a dataset at the route-mode-year
level, with N=244 route-years and J=2 modes. Because cartel policy
constrained railroads and steamships serving a given route to the same
prices, there are only as many pricing FOCs as there are route-years, hence
the halved sample for estimating costs. The price variable is computed as
a weighted average of published class rates for the given route, weighting
by the share of route traffic in each class in 1880. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Bootstrapped



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix for Online Publication
A Data Appendix
This paper draws on several sources of data, most importantly the SRSA records of freight traffic
on apportioned routes. As the paper describes, the SRSA collected daily data on the traffic and
revenue of carriers on competed routes, compiled these data into monthly tables, and circulated
these tables, as well as annual totals, to cartel members. These tables, as well as other SRSA
circulars, were collected into semiannual volumes and have been preserved in original hard copy at
the New York Public Library and Yale University archives.1
Figure A.1 provides an example table from these records. The table shows pounds and revenue
of merchandise shipments from Boston to Augusta, GA for the 1886-87 and 1887-88 fiscal years.
The table lists five different paths that freight traveled for this route: three by steamship plus
rail, and two entirely by rail. All-rail shipments can be identified as “via A.C.L.” or “via P.A.L.”,
while the steamship line items indicate the intermediate ports where freight was transshipped (here,
Savannah and Charleston). Similar tables are available for the remaining destinations, origins, and
years, though in most cases a table provides data for one period only.
Figure A.1: Example of Table from SRSA Traffic Reports
Notes: Figure shows an extracted table from the source data. The table lists total pounds
of traffic and revenue from merchandise shipments from Boston to Augusta, GA by carrier,
for June 1 to May 31, 1886 and for the same period in 1887. All-rail paths (termed “routes”
in the table) can be identified as either A.C.L. or P.A.L.
For the second half of the sample, the cartel operated on a June to May fiscal year and reported
annual data accordingly. This accounting period is ideally suited to the purposes of this paper,
as the gauge change occurred over May 31 and June 1, 1886 – such that the cartel’s annual data
provide the cleanest possible comparison. However, until 1886, the cartel operated on a September
to August fiscal year. For this earlier period, I therefore collected year-to-date (YTD) traffic in
May and August, in order to back out shipments for the June to May period. Concretely: The
1884 fiscal year spanned September 1883 to August 1884, but this paper requires totals from June
to May. To obtain them, I transcribed data from three YTD tables in the cartel traffic reports:
September 1882 to May 1883 (1), September 1882 to August 1883 (2), and September 1883 to May
1884 (3). I then impute June 1883 to May 1884 traffic as (2)-(1)+(3).
1A subset of the content in these circular letters are also available on microfilm from HBS Baker Library, though the
microfilm omits the monthly traffic reports which yield the data in this paper.
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To make clear how all-rail freight reached Southern interior cities, Figure A.2 shows maps of the
A.C.L. and P.A.L. circa 1885. Both served nearly every route in nearly every year, with a few
exceptions: the P.A.L. did not deliver freight to Macon in 1884-86, Athens in 1886, or Albany in
any year, and the A.C.L. did not deliver to Albany in 1890 (as inferred from their absence from
the respective traffic tables). Additionally, no data is available for Albany in 1887. As a result, the
sample reported in tables is reduced from 1,092 (= 52 · 3 · 7) to 1,036.
Figure A.2: All-Rail Paths connecting North and South ca. 1885
Panel A: Atlantic Coast Line (A.C.L.) Panel B: Piedmont Air Line (P.A.L.)
Notes: Figure provides maps of the two all-rail paths between the North and South, as of
1885: the Atlantic Coast Line and Piedmont Air Line. Each was established by mutual
agreement among the traversed railroads to facilitate interregional traffic. Maps acquired
from the David Rumsey Historical Map Collection.
On a few routes, merchandise shipments between Northern and Southern cities are occasionally
indicated to have entered the South from the West, via the Louisville and Nashville or the Cincinnati
Southern – crossing the Ohio River at Louisville and Cincinnati, respectively. In these cases,
it remains ambiguous whether the active mode was all-rail versus river steamer plus connecting
railroad. I thus omit these shipments from the analysis. As Figure A.3 shows, little is lost: the
omitted shipments on average comprise 0.8% of traffic in any given year.
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Figure A.3: Western paths’ share of North-South traffic
Notes: Figure shows the annual proportion of total traffic on the sampled
routes reported to have been by the L. & N. and the C.S. Railroads, osten-
sibly after having crossed the Ohio River. Due to ambiguity over the mode
of westward travel, this traffic is omitted from all analysis.
To estimate effects that vary with route length, I must measure distances between origin and
destination. Throughout the paper, I measure distance as “straight-line” (geodesic) distance, rather
than traveled distance, which is not observed. Though traveled distance can in concept be computed
for all-rail routes using maps and mapping software, the same cannot be done for steamships, and
it is unclear what additional information is generated. Indeed, one early-twentieth century source
(Ripley 1913) lists all-rail shipping distances from Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore
to Atlanta, and as Table A.1 shows, straight-line distance is a roughly fixed proportion (85%) of
the point-to-point track length between origin and destination.
Table A.1: Comparison of Straight-line and Track Distances
Origin Destination Straight-line (mi.) All-rail (mi.) Ratio
Boston Atlanta 937 1089 0.86
New York Atlanta 747 876 0.85
Philadelphia Atlanta 666 786 0.85
Baltimore Atlanta 577 690 0.84
Notes: Table compares straight-line (geodesic) distances and all-rail shipping distances
between the points shown. Shipping distances from Ripley (1913).
With a limited sample of routes – and particularly, with origins all in the northeast and destinations
in Georgia and Alabama – one might be concerned that the sample does not exhibit sufficient
variation in distance to identify this source of heterogeneity. Table A.2 lays this concern to rest,
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showing that across the 52 routes in the sample, distance varies from 500 to 1,100 miles, with a
25th-75th percentile spread of over 300 miles.
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics: Distribution of Route Distances
N Min p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 Max
Route Distance (mi.) 52 501.0 585.8 661.1 749.5 889.0 971.7 1111.8
Notes: Table summarizes the distribution of routes in the sample by straight-line
(geodesic) distance between northern origins and southern destinations. See Table 2
for a list of origins and destinations, and Figure 2 for a map.
Other Data
I also collect data from annual volumes of Poor’s Manual of Railroads (1868) to confirm the scale
of the gauge change. The Poor’s Manual was an annual compendium of railroads in the U.S. and
Canada that provides railroads’ location, mileage, information on their financial performance (when
available) – and conveniently, their gauge. These volumes allow me to calculate annual mileage by
region and gauge for the universe of U.S. railroads, and thereby observe both the growth of the
network and the standardization of gauge across the country.
To do so, I recorded the name, total mileage, and principal gauge of every railroad in five Poor’s
Manual volumes: 1882, 1883, 1886, 1888, and 1890 (which provide data from 1881, 1883, 1885,
1887, and 1889).2 I also recorded the region in which each railroad had principal operations: New
England (ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT); Middle Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA, DE, MD); Central Northern
(OH, IN, IL, MI, WI); South Atlantic (VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL); Gulf and Mississippi Valley
(KY, TN, AL, MS, LA); Southwestern (MO, AR, TX, KS, CO, NM); Northwestern (WY, NE, IA,
MN, Dakota Territory); and Pacific (CA, OR, WA, NV, AZ, UT). In two of the sampled volumes,
railroads are sorted alphabetically by these regions; in two other volumes, by state; and in one
volume, at the national level. Where available, I use the Poor’s Manual-designated region or state
as a railroad’s location. For the volume with national sorting, I infer each railroad’s location from
previous or later volumes, or from the address of its principal office (if not otherwise available).
There was of course a great deal of new construction and consolidation over this period, but all of
it is accounted for in these volumes – indeed, each volume concludes with a table listing all mergers
and acquisitions since the first volume in the series was published in 1868.
The collection of the Poor’s Manual data proved to be a painstaking process that required significant
attention to detail, as many railroads owned subsidiary lines that were listed twice (alone and under
the owner), and many railroads leased lines that were listed twice (alone and under the owner).
All subsidiary and leased lines were therefore cross-checked against the entered to data to ensure
they were not double-counted. The volumes also included railroads under construction, and every
2Please contact the author at dgross@hbs.edu if you would like to make use of these data. I extended a hearty thanks
to the Historical Collections team at HBS Baker Library for providing access to the Poor’s Manual volumes, and to
Mary Vasile for her help in compiling the data.
4
effort was made to count only completed mileage – though this count includes railroads which were
complete but not yet (or no longer) in operation. In a few cases, a gauge was not provided – when
this occurred, I inferred the gauge from previous or later volumes, from separately-listed parents
or subsidiaries, or from information obtained through Internet searches. There were also a few
railroads which listed multiple gauges, and I count these railroads as standard-gauge roads of one
of the listed gauges is standard gauge. Finally, in each volume there are a handful of railroads for
which the gauge could not be determined, and these railroads are omitted from all analysis, as the
cumulative mileage with unknown gauge in any given year is less than 0.1% of the network. In
Table 1, I sum railroad mileage by year, region, and gauge, consolidating the Poor’s regions into
five super-regions: New England, Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, South, and West.
I also make use of mapping data from two sources. I use the NHGIS state boundary shapefiles to
sketch states east of the Mississippi River, and Atack’s (2015) Historical Transportation Shapefiles
to map the railroad network. The Atack (2015) railroad shapefile includes railroads constructed
between 1826 and 1911; within this file, individual segments are identified by owner and gauge
through the Civil War, but this identifying information is not available for later periods. Given
the importance of this information to mapping the network by gauge, I restrict attention to set of
railroads in operation by 1861. I use these data to illustrate the diversity of gauge in 1861 and then
the standardization that took place through 1881 and 1891, leveraging the Poor’s Manual data to
identify later gauges of railroads in the Atack (2015) shapefile.
Appendix references not in paper:
Ripley, William Z. Railway Problems, Boston: Ginn and Company, 1913.
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B Contemporary Accounts of the Gauge Change
The gauge change received broad coverage in contemporary railroad periodicals and Southern news-
papers. The Atlanta Constitution reported on the SRSA’s gauge change convention as it was under-
way (Figure B.1), and the Louisville Courier-Journal reported several weeks later on the planning,
preparations, and procedure for converting 13,000 miles of track in one day (Figure B.2). Though
not widely covered in the North, the impending gauge change was nevertheless reported in a lengthy
article in The Commercial and Financial Chronicle on May 29, where the paper acknowledges that
“the matter is hardly attracting the attention it deserves,” and the New York Times reported on
May 31 that the Louisville and Nashville – the only Southern railroad of real importance to North-
ern shippers and investors – had completed its changeover that day, with no mention of the other
railroads simultaneously converting to standard gauge (Figures B.3 and B.4).
Contemporary accounts were not limited to reporting on the mechanics of the gauge change: some
newspapers speculated on the effects it might have, or was already having, on the Southern economy.
For example, the Wilmington Morning Star wrote in April 1886 that to date, “very little lumber
[goes] North by rail, for the reason that Southern roads [have] a different gauge from the Northern
roads,” and that “Southern lumber ports are bound to suffer a considerable loss of business”
following the gauge change (Figure B.5) – a prediction consistent with this paper’s results.
A year after the gauge change, in July 1887, The Railroad Gazette and other railroad journals
published a detailed postmortem analysis (Figure B.6) – covering the history of Southern gauge
and its “burden [on] both railroads and shippers,” the SRSA’s gauge change convention in February
1886 and the decision to convert to a 4' 9'' gauge on June 1, the plans and procedures for the day
of the conversion and the months leading up to it, the engineering challenges, and even estimates
of the aggregate expense of converting the rails and the rolling stock. For those interested, this
article is the best source for understanding how 13,000 miles of railroad track could be converted
to standard gauge in just 36 hours, and confirmation that it was.
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Figure B.1: Report of the Gauge Change Convention (Atlanta Constitution, February 3, 1886)
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Figure B.2: Preparations and Procedures for Conversion (Louisville Courier-Journal, March 23, 1886)
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Figure B.3: Report on the Conversion (The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, May 29, 1886)
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Report on the Conversion (CFC, cont’d)
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Figure B.4: Report on the Conversion (New York Times, May 31, 1886)
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Figure B.5: Example of Anticipated Effects (Wilmington Morning Star, April 16, 1886)
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C Vertical Structure of Freight Shipping
Long-distance freight shipment in the 19th century had an inherent vertical character: to get from
origin to destination, traffic had to traverse the tracks of multiple, separately-owned connecting
lines. Frictions in the vertical transactions required for through shipment were the source of decades
of holdup, and led to the formation of numerous innovative contractual relationships, which could
be the subject of an entire separate paper – and indeed are the focus of a large contemporary and
historical academic literature. For the purposes of this paper, a better understanding of vertical
contracting arrangements is both useful context and important to evaluating the model used to
estimate demand and supply and simulate competitive conduct.
C.1 How were long-distance shipments priced?
To fix terms, freight shipments borne by multiple, connecting carriers were known as “through”
shipments, typically traveling long distances. Shipments which could be delivered by the originating
carrier were “local” shipments. There were two approaches to pricing through shipments: the most
primitive method was a combination of local rates, whereby a shipment from point A to point C
would be charged the first carrier’s local rate from A to B plus the second carrier’s local rate from
B to C, which were independently determined. Given the number of local rates that had to be
considered on routes with many connections, and the frequency of rate changes, predicting the cost
of shipping under combination rates was a formidable challenge for shippers.
To simplify pricing, railroads began to set joint rates (also/more often termed as “through rates”),
which were point-to-point freight rates set jointly by carriers involved in the route, with a negotiated
division of revenue. By the dawn of the regulatory era, through rates were by far the most common
means of pricing through traffic. However, while there’s abundant discussion of the definition and
applications of through rates in historical records, there’s unfortunately remarkably little coverage
of how through rates were set, and how revenue was divided among carriers.
With effort, it was possible to unearth some contemporary references to the issue, which consistently
point to prorating of through revenue according to the distance of each carrier’s leg in the journey.
Proportions were determined by the “constructive mileage” of each leg, which is derived from true
distances but allows adjustments (Haney 1924). For example, in Congressional testimony in 1874,
the P.A.L. general manager claimed to prorate through revenue with the water lines with which it
connects (U.S. Congress 1874, p. 401), with ocean steamships prorating 3 miles for every 1 railroad
mile. In the same Congressional record, a representative of the Green Line (a fast freight line, see
next subsection) stated that all railroads in the organization received the same rate per mile from
through revenue (p. 786). Division pro rata thus appears to have been the norm.
Joint pricing was not the only means of contracting around vertical transfers of shipments. Trackage
rights were also common, which gave an originating carrier rights to travel freely over a connecting
carrier’s tracks. An alternative was vertical integration via merger or acquisition, which was also
occurring at a rapid pace during and after the Reconstruction era.
C.2 Who owned/controlled the rolling stock?
Vertical transfers of rolling stock were an entirely different contracting problem that was resolved
in a distinct way. While not as important to the paper as the process determining rates, it is useful
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to understand how rolling stock was transferred across railroads, and who maintained ownership
and control, as freight traveled the tracks of multiple carriers along its route.
The root of the problem is that, to send shipments over long distances on the same car, originating
railroads had to (i) send their rolling stock across connecting lines, and (ii) get it back. Conversely,
intermediate railroads had to host the rolling stock of their connections. The moral hazard problems
arise in several places: not only does the originating carrier have to relinquish control over its rolling
stock, but it also retains liability for damage or loss of its shipments on connections. Moreover,
different railroads might have different quality cars and different maintenance practices, and a low-
quality or poorly-maintained car could damage the tracks it traveled. As a result, until the 1860s,
freight had to be unloaded, unregistered, reregistered, and reloaded every time one line ended and
another began, imposing enormous costs and delays on through traffic.
To address these issues, railroads around the country formed “fast freight lines” in the 1860s and
1870s, which were joint ventures between connecting railroads which pooled their freight cars into
a shared rolling stock. The largest of these in the South was the Green Line fast-freight company,
established in 1868. Under the agreement, members of the Green Line submitted rolling stock to
the common pool in proportion to their total track mileage, and members were paid 1.5 cents per
car-mile when other carriers used their cars. Ordinary maintenance was performed by the railroad
operating the car and charged to its owner, but if a railroad damaged another carrier’s car, it
would be responsible for repairing or replacing it – though enforcement of this latter provision was
inherently challenged by the difficulty of determining the party at fault.3,4
C.3 What was the vertical structure in the South?
Though these contracting innovations were being developed around the country during Reconstruc-
tion, the key question for this paper is ultimately what vertical contracting arrangements were in
place in the South around the time of the gauge change, to evaluate whether the model of industry
conduct is appropriate. The fundamental issues are (i) whether SRSA freight rates were for end-
to-end North-South freight traffic, (ii) whether they applied to both railroads and steamships, and
(iii) whether they were determined in coordination with Northern carriers (which comprised half
of each all-rail route) and how revenue from each shipment was divided. If the answer to any of
these questions is in the negative, or if revenue division was endogenous, the model of the market
could require nonstandard features such as bargaining or a vertical dimension.
Details of the SRSA’s vertical contracting arrangements are thin at best. What is clear from SRSA
records is that the cartel rates were through rates, from origin to destination, and that these rates
applied to all lines in the cartel. However, the records say nothing about how through revenue
was divided among carriers down the line, nor about what role Northern railroads played in price-
setting, and other sources have not yielded any insight. My understanding from cartel documents
and later accounts is that the SRSA fundamentally controlled prices on shipments into and out of
the South – in part due to its outsize influence over these routes, and in part because Southern traffic
was relatively unimportant to Northern carriers in volume and value – and it is thus appropriate
to model the SRSA as a price-setter.5 Revenue from each shipment was likely distributed pro rata,
3When asked by Congress “How do you know whether it is the fault of the road or ... the car?” a Green Line agent
responded that the issue was an ongoing source of contention (U.S. Congress 1874, p. 788).
4For more information on the Green Line, see the following sources: Sindall (1886, pp. 680-861), Joubert (1949, pp.
31-40), Taylor and Neu (1956, pp. 67-76), and Puffert (2009, p. 134).
5Total railroad tonnage in the New England, Mid-Atlantic, and Great Lakes regions was over 10x that in the South
in 1880, and the difference in ton-miles even greater (U.S. Department of Interior 1883).
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following industry norms, such that revenue division is orthogonal to prices and would not enter or
affect the cartel’s profit-maximization problem.
Appendix references not in paper:
Haney, Lewis H. The Business of Railway Transportation, New York: Ronald Press Company, 1924.
U.S. Congress. Reports of the Select Committee on Transportation Routes to the Seaboard, Wash-
ington: Government Printing Office, 1874.
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D Sensitivity Checks
D.1 Sensitivity Checks: Dropping Origins
The tables in this section evaluate the sensitivity of the main results in Tables 4 and 6 to dropping
observations with a given origin.
Table D.1: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Boston
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 3.342*** 3.362*** 3.363*** 3.412*** 3.368*** 3.455***
(0.827) (0.780) (0.782) (0.801) (0.955) (0.983)
* distance (100 mi) -0.460*** -0.470*** -0.470*** -0.474*** -0.469*** -0.478***
(0.122) (0.115) (0.115) (0.118) (0.141) (0.144)
Breakeven distance 727.1 715.7 715.8 720.3 717.7 722.9
(31.3) (27.3) (27.4) (28.9) (33.4) (35.5)
N 777 777 777 777 777 777
R2 0.34 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.71 0.75
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with an origin of Boston. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.2: Share of Traffic, omitting Boston
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 3.369*** 3.471***
(0.691) (0.734)
* distance (100 mi) -0.481*** -0.487***
(0.102) (0.107)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in
Table 6, omitting observations with an origin of Boston. *,
**, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.3: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting New York
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.314*** 2.313*** 2.310*** 2.367*** 2.358*** 2.430***
(0.460) (0.449) (0.449) (0.469) (0.548) (0.590)
* distance (100 mi) -0.301*** -0.308*** -0.307*** -0.314*** -0.313*** -0.321***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.060) (0.070) (0.075)
Breakeven distance 767.7 752.0 751.5 754.5 754.0 755.8
(41.0) (39.1) (39.1) (39.5) (46.7) (47.9)
N 777 777 777 777 777 777
R2 0.28 0.67 0.67 0.71 0.70 0.73
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with an origin of New York. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.4: Share of Traffic, omitting New York
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.155*** 2.275***
(0.424) (0.452)
* distance (100 mi) -0.293*** -0.305***
(0.055) (0.057)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with an origin of New York. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.5: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Philadelphia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.487*** 2.466*** 2.458*** 2.502*** 2.472*** 2.519***
(0.489) (0.485) (0.484) (0.495) (0.585) (0.606)
* distance (100 mi) -0.323*** -0.327*** -0.327*** -0.332*** -0.327*** -0.334***
(0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.074) (0.076)
Breakeven distance 770.6 753.6 752.7 754.0 755.9 754.8
(37.3) (35.4) (35.4) (35.0) (43.3) (42.3)
N 777 777 777 777 777 777
R2 0.34 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.70 0.77
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with an origin of Philadelphia. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.6: Share of Traffic, omitting Philadelphia
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.320*** 2.396***
(0.455) (0.472)
* distance (100 mi) -0.313*** -0.321***
(0.057) (0.059)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with an origin of Philadelphia. *,
**, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.7: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Baltimore
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.133*** 2.108*** 2.102*** 2.196*** 2.203*** 2.325**
(0.653) (0.644) (0.645) (0.676) (0.807) (0.870)
* distance (100 mi) -0.289*** -0.293*** -0.292*** -0.304*** -0.302*** -0.318***
(0.075) (0.076) (0.076) (0.079) (0.095) (0.101)
Breakeven distance 737.9 719.5 718.8 723.3 728.6 731.9
(55.3) (54.0) (54.2) (53.4) (63.6) (63.1)
N 777 777 777 777 777 777
R2 0.34 0.68 0.68 0.73 0.71 0.76
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with an origin of Baltimore. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.8: Share of Traffic, omitting Baltimore
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 1.905*** 2.088***
(0.611) (0.658)
* distance (100 mi) -0.273*** -0.293***
(0.071) (0.076)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with an origin of Baltimore. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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D.2 Sensitivity Checks: Dropping Destinations
The tables in this section evaluate the sensitivity of the main results in Tables 4 and 6 to dropping
observations with a given destination.
Table D.9: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Albany
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.298*** 2.288*** 2.281*** 2.328*** 2.348*** 2.405***
(0.458) (0.449) (0.448) (0.462) (0.542) (0.569)
* distance (100 mi) -0.311*** -0.316*** -0.316*** -0.319*** -0.322*** -0.327***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.070) (0.072)
Breakeven distance 738.8 723.5 722.8 728.9 728.7 735.8
(34.9) (33.0) (33.0) (34.1) (39.1) (41.3)
N 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.32 0.66 0.66 0.72 0.69 0.74
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Albany. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.10: Share of Traffic, omitting Albany
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.200*** 2.306***
(0.427) (0.449)
* distance (100 mi) -0.309*** -0.317***
(0.055) (0.057)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Albany. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.11: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Athens
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.199*** 2.178*** 2.179*** 2.247*** 2.210*** 2.304***
(0.461) (0.450) (0.452) (0.468) (0.555) (0.589)
* distance (100 mi) -0.301*** -0.305*** -0.306*** -0.313*** -0.308*** -0.319***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.072) (0.075)
Breakeven distance 731.0 713.2 713.1 717.9 716.6 721.4
(38.3) (36.1) (36.1) (36.4) (43.6) (44.3)
N 956 956 956 956 956 956
R2 0.33 0.69 0.69 0.74 0.71 0.77
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Athens. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.12: Share of Traffic, omitting Athens
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.034*** 2.193***
(0.426) (0.464)
* distance (100 mi) -0.293*** -0.308***
(0.055) (0.059)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Athens. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.13: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Atlanta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.637*** 2.587*** 2.583*** 2.646*** 2.632*** 2.712***
(0.475) (0.467) (0.468) (0.478) (0.574) (0.597)
* distance (100 mi) -0.339*** -0.342*** -0.342*** -0.349*** -0.346*** -0.356***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.076) (0.077)
Breakeven distance 776.8 756.2 755.8 758.3 760.2 761.6
(35.3) (33.1) (33.1) (33.0) (40.3) (40.0)
N 952 952 952 952 952 952
R2 0.35 0.65 0.65 0.72 0.68 0.75
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Atlanta. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.14: Share of Traffic, omitting Atlanta
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.429*** 2.562***
(0.438) (0.462)
* distance (100 mi) -0.328*** -0.341***
(0.057) (0.059)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Atlanta. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.15: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Augusta
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.634*** 2.532*** 2.527*** 2.594*** 2.576*** 2.658***
(0.529) (0.513) (0.514) (0.528) (0.631) (0.659)
* distance (100 mi) -0.341*** -0.337*** -0.337*** -0.344*** -0.341*** -0.352***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.080) (0.082)
Breakeven distance 772.1 750.8 750.3 753.0 754.6 756.1
(35.8) (34.6) (34.6) (34.6) (41.9) (41.8)
N 952 952 952 952 952 952
R2 0.33 0.64 0.64 0.70 0.66 0.72
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Augusta. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.16: Share of Traffic, omitting Augusta
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.358*** 2.490***
(0.485) (0.514)
* distance (100 mi) -0.321*** -0.334***
(0.061) (0.064)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Augusta. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.17: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Macon
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.353*** 2.354*** 2.351*** 2.362*** 2.340*** 2.348***
(0.471) (0.481) (0.482) (0.487) (0.588) (0.598)
* distance (100 mi) -0.318*** -0.319*** -0.319*** -0.322*** -0.317*** -0.321***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.077) (0.077)
Breakeven distance 740.2 738.5 737.9 734.0 739.1 731.5
(36.3) (36.3) (36.3) (35.8) (44.8) (43.6)
N 964 964 964 964 964 964
R2 0.30 0.66 0.66 0.71 0.68 0.74
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Macon. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.18: Share of Traffic, omitting Macon
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.253*** 2.244***
(0.454) (0.462)
* distance (100 mi) -0.309*** -0.311***
(0.059) (0.059)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Macon. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.19: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Milledgeville
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.218*** 2.231*** 2.228*** 2.296*** 2.271*** 2.358***
(0.478) (0.479) (0.480) (0.493) (0.590) (0.617)
* distance (100 mi) -0.297*** -0.305*** -0.305*** -0.313*** -0.309*** -0.320***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.076) (0.078)
Breakeven distance 745.9 730.4 730.1 733.6 734.6 736.9
(39.9) (37.7) (37.7) (37.6) (45.6) (45.6)
N 952 952 952 952 952 952
R2 0.32 0.66 0.66 0.72 0.69 0.74
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Milledgeville. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and
0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.20: Share of Traffic, omitting Milledgeville
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.047*** 2.193***
(0.444) (0.473)
* distance (100 mi) -0.289*** -0.303***
(0.057) (0.060)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Milledgeville.
*, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.21: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Montgomery
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.343*** 2.366*** 2.362*** 2.428*** 2.407*** 2.496***
(0.489) (0.481) (0.482) (0.493) (0.596) (0.619)
* distance (100 mi) -0.303*** -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.321*** -0.318*** -0.329***
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.079) (0.081)
Breakeven distance 774.1 753.8 753.4 755.8 757.2 757.8
(39.2) (35.7) (35.7) (35.4) (43.6) (42.7)
N 952 952 952 952 952 952
R2 0.30 0.68 0.68 0.73 0.70 0.76
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Montgomery. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and
0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.22: Share of Traffic, omitting Montgomery
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.230*** 2.350***
(0.455) (0.475)
* distance (100 mi) -0.303*** -0.315***
(0.060) (0.062)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Montgomery.
*, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
29
Table D.23: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Newnan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.590*** 2.598*** 2.595*** 2.655*** 2.640*** 2.718***
(0.469) (0.467) (0.468) (0.479) (0.576) (0.600)
* distance (100 mi) -0.346*** -0.353*** -0.353*** -0.360*** -0.357*** -0.367***
(0.059) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.074) (0.076)
Breakeven distance 748.9 735.3 735.0 737.6 739.0 740.6
(34.4) (32.5) (32.5) (32.5) (39.4) (39.4)
N 952 952 952 952 952 952
R2 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.69 0.76
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Newnan. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.24: Share of Traffic, omitting Newnan
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.448*** 2.572***
(0.440) (0.464)
* distance (100 mi) -0.340*** -0.353***
(0.056) (0.058)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Newnan. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.25: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Opelika
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.440*** 2.443*** 2.438*** 2.498*** 2.485*** 2.559***
(0.481) (0.477) (0.477) (0.486) (0.589) (0.608)
* distance (100 mi) -0.328*** -0.336*** -0.335*** -0.342*** -0.340*** -0.349***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.078) (0.079)
Breakeven distance 743.1 727.1 726.7 729.7 730.8 732.8
(35.3) (32.7) (32.7) (32.9) (39.7) (39.9)
N 952 952 952 952 952 952
R2 0.32 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.71 0.76
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Opelika. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.26: Share of Traffic, omitting Opelika
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.291*** 2.414***
(0.451) (0.470)
* distance (100 mi) -0.323*** -0.335***
(0.060) (0.061)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Opelika. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.27: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Rome
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.835*** 2.828*** 2.823*** 2.898*** 2.863*** 2.958***
(0.438) (0.426) (0.427) (0.436) (0.524) (0.548)
* distance (100 mi) -0.364*** -0.370*** -0.370*** -0.378*** -0.373*** -0.385***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.072) (0.074)
Breakeven distance 779.2 763.9 763.4 765.9 767.4 768.4
(30.6) (27.9) (27.8) (27.4) (34.4) (33.5)
N 952 952 952 952 952 952
R2 0.30 0.68 0.68 0.73 0.70 0.75
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Rome. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.28: Share of Traffic, omitting Rome
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.658*** 2.817***
(0.402) (0.419)
* distance (100 mi) -0.355*** -0.371***
(0.055) (0.056)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Rome. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.29: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting Selma
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.378*** 2.405*** 2.403*** 2.469*** 2.438*** 2.529***
(0.504) (0.497) (0.498) (0.508) (0.613) (0.635)
* distance (100 mi) -0.310*** -0.321*** -0.321*** -0.329*** -0.324*** -0.336***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.082) (0.084)
Breakeven distance 766.9 748.3 747.8 750.2 752.2 752.9
(38.7) (35.2) (35.2) (34.9) (43.1) (42.3)
N 952 952 952 952 952 952
R2 0.29 0.67 0.67 0.72 0.69 0.75
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of Selma. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.30: Share of Traffic, omitting Selma
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.264*** 2.385***
(0.469) (0.489)
* distance (100 mi) -0.310*** -0.322***
(0.063) (0.064)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of Selma. *, **,
*** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.31: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting A. & W. Pt.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.442*** 2.447*** 2.441*** 2.500*** 2.489*** 2.560***
(0.488) (0.482) (0.482) (0.492) (0.597) (0.616)
* distance (100 mi) -0.319*** -0.326*** -0.326*** -0.332*** -0.331*** -0.340***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.078) (0.079)
Breakeven distance 766.1 749.4 748.9 751.9 752.3 754.1
(37.8) (35.2) (35.2) (35.2) (42.7) (42.6)
N 952 952 952 952 952 952
R2 0.33 0.69 0.69 0.74 0.71 0.76
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of A. & W. Pt.. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and
0.01 levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.32: Share of Traffic, omitting A. & W. Pt.
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.287*** 2.410***
(0.453) (0.476)
* distance (100 mi) -0.312*** -0.325***
(0.059) (0.061)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of A. & W. Pt..
*, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.33: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting W. & A.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.298*** 2.300*** 2.294*** 2.354*** 2.342*** 2.416***
(0.485) (0.480) (0.480) (0.491) (0.593) (0.616)
* distance (100 mi) -0.307*** -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.321*** -0.318*** -0.328***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.077) (0.078)
Breakeven distance 748.1 731.8 731.1 734.2 735.8 737.5
(39.4) (37.0) (37.0) (37.0) (44.7) (44.9)
N 952 952 952 952 952 952
R2 0.33 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.71 0.76
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations
with a destination of W. & A.. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.34: Share of Traffic, omitting W. & A.
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.143*** 2.253***
(0.453) (0.471)
* distance (100 mi) -0.300*** -0.311***
(0.059) (0.060)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table
6, omitting observations with a destination of W. & A.. *,
**, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively. SEs clustered by route in parentheses.
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D.3 Sensitivity Checks: Dropping Years
The tables in this section evaluate the sensitivity of the main results in Tables 4 and 6 to dropping
observations in a given year.
Table D.35: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1884
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.730*** 2.712*** 2.704*** 2.777*** 2.746*** 2.837***
(0.567) (0.560) (0.558) (0.573) (0.683) (0.707)
* distance (100 mi) -0.350*** -0.355*** -0.354*** -0.363*** -0.357*** -0.368***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.088) (0.090)
Breakeven distance 780.5 764.2 763.5 765.5 769.7 770.1
(37.8) (36.0) (35.9) (35.8) (44.4) (43.7)
N 888 888 888 888 888 888
R2 0.32 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.69 0.75
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in
1884. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.36: Share of Traffic, omitting 1884
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.563*** 2.685***
(0.532) (0.545)
* distance (100 mi) -0.341*** -0.354***
(0.069) (0.069)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in
Table 6, omitting observations in 1884. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.37: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1885
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.291*** 2.274*** 2.272*** 2.330*** 2.277*** 2.354***
(0.455) (0.447) (0.448) (0.465) (0.537) (0.572)
* distance (100 mi) -0.318*** -0.323*** -0.323*** -0.330*** -0.321*** -0.331***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.068) (0.071)
Breakeven distance 721.3 704.3 704.0 706.3 710.3 711.8
(35.6) (34.0) (34.0) (34.2) (41.6) (42.1)
N 888 888 888 888 888 888
R2 0.32 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.75
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in
1885. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.38: Share of Traffic, omitting 1885
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.084*** 2.182***
(0.411) (0.445)
* distance (100 mi) -0.303*** -0.314***
(0.052) (0.055)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in
Table 6, omitting observations in 1885. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.39: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1886
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.297*** 2.286*** 2.287*** 2.338*** 2.375*** 2.450***
(0.484) (0.494) (0.495) (0.508) (0.621) (0.651)
* distance (100 mi) -0.300*** -0.305*** -0.305*** -0.310*** -0.317*** -0.325***
(0.065) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) (0.084) (0.087)
Breakeven distance 765.9 749.4 749.3 753.5 749.4 753.3
(39.4) (37.2) (37.2) (37.9) (43.0) (44.3)
N 892 892 892 892 892 892
R2 0.32 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.69 0.75
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in
1886. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.40: Share of Traffic, omitting 1886
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.197*** 2.329***
(0.480) (0.512)
* distance (100 mi) -0.300*** -0.312***
(0.065) (0.068)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in
Table 6, omitting observations in 1886. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.41: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1887
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.561*** 2.571*** 2.566*** 2.623*** 2.595*** 2.669***
(0.512) (0.515) (0.516) (0.534) (0.631) (0.664)
* distance (100 mi) -0.346*** -0.356*** -0.356*** -0.361*** -0.358*** -0.366***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.068) (0.081) (0.085)
Breakeven distance 740.7 721.9 721.7 726.1 724.8 728.6
(35.9) (33.7) (33.7) (34.5) (40.6) (41.8)
N 892 892 892 892 892 892
R2 0.32 0.68 0.68 0.73 0.70 0.76
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in
1887. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.42: Share of Traffic, omitting 1887
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.406*** 2.533***
(0.489) (0.522)
* distance (100 mi) -0.341*** -0.353***
(0.063) (0.066)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in
Table 6, omitting observations in 1887. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.43: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1888
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.483*** 2.477*** 2.473*** 2.532*** 2.496*** 2.567***
(0.471) (0.461) (0.462) (0.473) (0.563) (0.588)
* distance (100 mi) -0.321*** -0.327*** -0.327*** -0.334*** -0.328*** -0.338***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.076) (0.078)
Breakeven distance 774.2 757.6 757.1 758.4 761.3 759.8
(36.8) (33.7) (33.7) (33.6) (41.7) (41.2)
N 884 884 884 884 884 884
R2 0.31 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.75
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in
1888. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.44: Share of Traffic, omitting 1888
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.318*** 2.440***
(0.433) (0.457)
* distance (100 mi) -0.312*** -0.325***
(0.059) (0.061)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in
Table 6, omitting observations in 1888. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.45: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1889
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.353*** 2.352*** 2.348*** 2.405*** 2.389*** 2.454***
(0.423) (0.423) (0.422) (0.434) (0.520) (0.541)
* distance (100 mi) -0.310*** -0.317*** -0.317*** -0.324*** -0.322*** -0.331***
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.068) (0.068)
Breakeven distance 757.7 741.1 740.6 741.7 742.5 740.8
(34.5) (32.3) (32.3) (32.1) (38.7) (38.5)
N 884 884 884 884 884 884
R2 0.31 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.70 0.76
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in
1889. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.46: Share of Traffic, omitting 1889
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.214*** 2.327***
(0.397) (0.417)
* distance (100 mi) -0.306*** -0.319***
(0.052) (0.053)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in
Table 6, omitting observations in 1889. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
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Table D.47: Change in All-Rail Traffic, omitting 1890
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All-rail x post-change 2.351*** 2.329*** 2.326*** 2.387*** 2.380*** 2.455***
(0.497) (0.488) (0.489) (0.502) (0.593) (0.622)
* distance (100 mi) -0.311*** -0.312*** -0.312*** -0.319*** -0.317*** -0.326***
(0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.077) (0.080)
Breakeven distance 755.0 745.7 744.9 748.1 750.2 753.9
(37.0) (36.5) (36.6) (36.5) (43.7) (44.2)
N 888 888 888 888 888 888
R2 0.32 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.69 0.75
Route FE X X
Mode FE X
Year FE X
Route-mode FE X X
Route-yr FE X X
Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in Table 4, omitting observations in
1890. *, **, *** represent significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
Table D.48: Share of Traffic, omitting 1890
(1) (2)
All-rail x post-change 2.185*** 2.310***
(0.454) (0.480)
* distance (100 mi) -0.299*** -0.311***
(0.059) (0.061)





Notes: This table is a robustness check on the results in
Table 6, omitting observations in 1890. *, **, *** represent
significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. SEs
clustered by route in parentheses.
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E International Railway Agreements
This appendix provides more background on the persistence of breaks in gauge around the world
today, accompanying the discussion in Section 6 on what these results might teach us regarding
the value of standardizing railway gauge in the present. Though countries in North America and
Western Europe have adopted a common standard, gauge breaks are prevalent in underdeveloped
regions, including most of Asia, Africa, and South America.
To focus attention, I invoke two examples: Asia and the European periphery. Table E.1 shows the
principal gauges currently used in countries in South and Southeast Asia. This diversity precluded
an agreement to unify domestic railways into a transcontinental railway network for over 50 years,
and the problem of incompatibility was never fully resolved: when the Trans-Asian Railway Network
Agreement (UNTC 2006) was ratified in 2006, they skirted the issue, instead opting to continue
using adapters at border crossings, which were enumerated in the agreement itself.
Similarly, when European countries agreed to unify their railway networks in 1991, no uniform
standard was specified. Though much of Western Europe was on standard gauge, breaks persisted
in various places. Table E.2 lists the interchange stations enumerated in the European Agreement
on Important International Combined Transport Lines (UNTC 1991, p. 38), as well as the means
of interchange at each station – which are (shockingly) the same technologies that were in use 100
years prior. These breaks are present mostly along the eastern periphery, though there are also two
junctions where French and Spanish tracks of incompatible gauge meet.
To make the problem more concrete, Figures E.1 and E.2 illustrate the diversity in gauge in Asia
and around the world. The former figure is taken from supporting documentation for the Trans-
Asian Railway Network Agreement and maps the major lines in Asia, color-coding by gauge. The
latter figure is from Wikipedia and shows a map of the world which color-codes countries by their
principal gauge. Both figures make it visually obvious just how much of a problem breaks in gauge
continue to be in less developed parts of the world: sending a rail car from Europe to Southeast
Asia requires at least two interchanges, and from parts of Russia, three.
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Figure E.1: World Map, Color-coding Countries by Principal Gauge
Notes: Map illustrates the principal gauge of individual countries around the world,
color-coding each country by gauge, thereby making the prevalence of breaks visually
apparent. Figure obtained from Wikipedia, available at https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/1/1f/Rail gauge world.jpg.
Figure E.2: Map of Principal Lines in Asia, Color-coded by Gauge (2006)
Notes: Map shows major lines in Asia covered by the Trans-Asian Railway
Network Agreement (UNTC 2006), as well as links planned under the agree-
ment, color-coding by gauge. Figure published in 1999 and available as part
of the supporting documentation for the TAR.
44
Table E.1: Railway Gauge of Trans-Asian Railway Members at Time of Agreement (2006)
1,000 mm 1,067 mm 1,435 mm 1,520 mm 1,676 mm
(3’ 3.375”) (3’ 6”) (4’ 8.5”) (6’ 0”) (6’ 6”)
Bangladesh Indonesia China Armenia Bangladesh
Laos North Korea Azerbaijan India
Malaysia South Korea Georgia Nepal
Myanmar Iran Kazakhstan Pakistan






Notes: Table lists the varying railroad gauge standards of the countries that were
party to or affected by the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Trans-Asian Rail-
way Network at the time of ratification (November 21, 2006). Data from text of
the agreement (UNTC 2006).
Table E.2: Gauge Interchanges on European Country Borders at Time of Agreement (1991)
Means of Interchange
Number of Change of wagon Transshipment by crane
Countries Interchanges axles/bogies or other equipment
Hungary-Ukraine 2 X X
Romania-Moldova 2 X X
Romania-Ukraine 2 X X
Spain-France 2 X X
Poland-Belarus 1 X X
Poland-Lithuania 1 X X
Poland-Ukraine 1 X X
Russia-North Korea 1 X X
Russia-China 1 X X
Kazakhstan-China 1 X X
Slovakia-Ukraine 1 X
Notes: Table counts number of gauge interchange stations on the border between country pairs, and
the means of interchange used to transfer freight across gauges, at the time of the European Agreement
on Important International Combined Transport Lines and Related Installations (February 1, 1991).
Data from text of the agreement (UNTC 1991).
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